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INTRODUCTION
It is finally over. The Supreme Court‘s incursion into punitive damages
jurisprudence has unceremoniously ended, but not before the Court, under
the guise of substantive due process, erected a complex and
constitutionally dubious set of rules in an effort to fix the heretoforeintractable multiple punishments problem.1 As is often the case, the
incrementalist approach taken by the Court allowed this conquest to occur
somewhat quietly. Professor Pamela Karlan observes that ―most
constitutional law scholars have hardly noticed that the most significant
innovation in substantive due process during the Rehnquist and Roberts
Court years‖ has been the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.2
This ―innovation‖ has been accomplished through an unusual coalition
of liberal and conservative Justices in the various closely divided decisions
along the way.3 With the addition of four new Justices since the last case
the Court decided on substantive due process grounds4—two appointed by
President George W. Bush and two appointed by President Barack
Obama—it is unsurprising that many Court followers claim that the status
of punitive damages jurisprudence is ―unstable and uncertain‖ and that
what will happen in the future is ―impossible to tell.‖5 As demonstrated in
1. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and
Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 406 (1994) (referring to the multiple punishments problem as ―the
most momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court‖); see also infra note 218.
2. Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2009).
3. In fact, of the five current members of the Court who participated in the last case
purportedly decided on substantive due process grounds, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), Reagan-appointee Justice Anthony Kennedy and Clintonappointee Justice Stephen Breyer were in the majority, while the conservative Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas and the liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg were together in dissent.
4. See infra Part IV.C.
5. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, How Could the Supreme Court Shift After Stevens?,
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this Article, however, precisely the opposite is true. Contrary to outward
appearances, a careful review of the Court‘s most recent activity in this
area—Philip Morris USA v. Williams6—reveals that the Court is almost
certainly entering an extended silent phase in its punitive damages
jurisprudence and will not be reviewing any more punitive damages awards
in the foreseeable future.
The Court‘s recent foray into punitive damages has, however, left the
dissenting Justices and punitive damages scholars complaining that the
Court‘s jurisprudence is ―insusceptible of principled application.‖7 While
Philip Morris made some progress toward clarifying much of the lingering
ambiguity,8 it still left ample room for continued criticism of whether the
approach it has adopted is principled. Along the way, however, the Court
did make significant progress toward addressing its primary animating
concern with punitive damages—the multiple punishments problem.9
Simply stated, this problem occurs when ―a defendant, who has injured
multiple potential plaintiffs by a single act or course of conduct, faces
multiple punitive damages awards for that conduct.‖10 While this persistent
problem would be best remedied by Congress,11 the Court‘s attempts at a
fix have led to awkward and highly questionable opinions that expose the
Court to increasing criticism that its punitive damages jurisprudence
consists of nothing more than results-oriented, substantive due process
decisions that simply reflect the individual Justices‘ senses of fairness.12
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/how-could-thesupreme-court-shift-after-stevens (basing a conclusion of unpredictability on the fact that three
Justices who favor the current framework have retired while three who oppose it have not).
6. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
7. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at
364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Supreme Court‘s recent punitive damages
jurisprudence as ―less than crystalline‖); McClain v. Metabolife Int‘l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225,
1228–29 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (lamenting that while the court delayed ruling on post-judgment motions
until State Farm was decided, it ―is not sure that the wait was worth it‖ and declaring, ―[T]he court
is not sure that it fully comprehends all of the possible lessons in State Farm.‖); Jim Gash, Punitive
Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitution, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1239 (―By, in
essence, failing to show his work, Justice Kennedy does guarantee that much ink and effort will be
expended by lower courts, commentators, and ultimately the Supreme Court in an effort to
understand and apply the State Farm opinion.‖).
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See, e.g., Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1613–14 (2005) (declaring the multiple
punishments problem to be ―major and growing‖ and widely recognized as having ―currently no
satisfactory solution‖); Owen, supra note 1, at 406.
10. Gash, supra note 9, at 1613–14.
11. Id. at 1644 app. (arguing that federal legislation is necessary to fully and finally resolve
this problem and offering statutory language that would do just that).
12. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 613 n.5 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the substantive due process question of whether the punitive damages
award is ―[t]oo big‖ comes down to ―the amount at which five Members of the Court bridle‖).
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Judicial conservatives and punitive damages scholars critical of the
Supreme Court‘s adverse possession of important aspects of punitive
damages jurisprudence13 had good reason to hope that the substantive due
process power grab by the Court in the realm of punitive damages would
be reversed soon after Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito
were confirmed. They were sorely disappointed, however, when Roberts
and Alito rejected pleas from, inter alia, conservative stalwarts Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas urging the Court to butt out of punitive
damages.14 Instead, Roberts and Alito seemed to accelerate the Court‘s
encroachment by joining the majority in the Court‘s 5–4 decision in Philip
Morris.15 This case was the eighth in a series of closely divided cases over
the last two decades16 whereby the Court constitutionalized this area of
law, previously reserved to the several states.17
13. See Stacey Obrecht, Case Note, Punitive Damage Determinations: A Jury‟s Factual
Inquiry or a Court‟s Mathematical Leash, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408 (2003), 5 WYO. L. REV. 637, 650–51 (2005) (―The State Farm Court has given the opponents
of ‗activist judges‘ additional ammunition for their arguments because this holding ‗disregard[ed]
the Court‘s own considered reluctance to expand the open-ended reach of substantive due process
and hearkens back to the discredited Lochner era of judicial activism.‘ It took the power from the
states and ‗merely place[d] . . . [the Supreme] Court in the position of a Court of Additional
Appeals from state courts.‘‖ (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass‘n of Trial Lawyers of Am. in
Support of the Respondents at 2–3, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003) (No. 01-1289), 2002 WL 31387416)); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court ―unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the States‘
domain‖); id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court‘s activities in [the area of punitive
damages] are an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments.‖).
14. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its Unanimity, SLATE
(Feb. 21, 2007, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2160286 (―For originalists who look to the
Constitution‘s text, the discovery of limits on punitive damages in the due process clause is of
dubious pedigree. . . . Yet Roberts and Alito were in the limits-imposing majority. . . . Is it
disappointing that in this instance Roberts and Alito boarded the Constitution-can-mean-anything
train? Yes. Every disregard of principle here is likely to be played back elsewhere.‖); see also
Vikram David Amar, The Supreme Court‟s Recent Philip Morris Punitive Damages Decision: What
It Reveals About How Constitutional Law Gets Made, and How the Court Functions, FINDLAW‘S
WRIT (Mar. 2, 2007), http://writ.news/findlaw.com/amar/20070302.html (―Interestingly, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both of whom—especially Justice Alito—seemed during
confirmation somewhat skeptical of substantive due process in the abortion and same-sex conduct
settings, felt comfortable applying (at least a variant of) the concept to strike down the jury award in
Philip Morris. Perhaps Justice Breyer‘s (not quite convincing, to me) use of the adjective
‗procedural‘ in his majority opinion allowed these two newcomers to sleep a little easier after
joining the opinion.‖).
15. The majority opinion was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and David Souter. Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg each filed
separate dissenting opinions, with Thomas and Scalia joining Ginsburg‘s dissent. See Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That
Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 468 (2005) (―For more than two
hundred years, the Court deferred to the states‘ choice of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary
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A ray of hope emerged a few months later, however, when the Court
agreed to review another case (regarding the Exxon Valdez oil spill)
involving a huge punitive damages award.18 But this hope quickly faded
when the Court strictly limited its review to matters of federal maritime
law, expressly refusing to evaluate the punitive damages award on due
process grounds.19
Another ray of hope emerged with the successive retirements of
Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter, both of whom fully
subscribed to and supported the Court‘s substantive due process
jurisprudence. But an examination of the available writings and records of
President Obama‘s replacements for Stevens and Souter (Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan) reveals no reason to believe that both would
adopt the view shared by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas that the
size of punitive damage awards should be left to the states.20Although
Justice Kagan‘s lack of judicial experience makes it impossible to divine
her jurisprudential methodology with anything approaching certainty,21 and
while Justice Sotomayor‘s track record on punitive damages simply
reflects her application of Supreme Court precedent without betraying her
rules for assessing and awarding punitive damages.‖).
18. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 552 U.S. 989 (2007) (granting certiorari).
19. The petition for certiorari sought review on the following three questions:
1.
May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a shipowner
(as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship‘s master at sea, absent a finding that
the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when
the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner?
2.
When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime
conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided
for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit
held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand
the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy?
3.
Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of
all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history,
within the limits allowed by (1) federal maritime law or (2) if maritime law could
permit such an award, constitutional due process?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Exxon, 552 U.S. 989 (No. 07-219), 2007 WL 2383784, at *i.
The Court limited its review to questions 1, 2, and 3(1) only. Exxon, 552 U.S. 989.
20. See infra Part IV.C.2–3.
21. See Paul Campos, Blank Slate, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 8, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/blank-slate (―Unfortunately, nobody seems to know what
Kagan‘s views are on most political issues, nor does anyone know what she believes about how
judges ought to interpret the Constitution, how much deference courts should give to Congress and
state legislatures, and what role the judiciary should play in checking the powers of the executive
branch. We don‘t know because she hasn‘t told us.‖).
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personal beliefs,22 the fact that the newest Justices are widely viewed as
left-leaning centrists23 makes it highly unlikely that both would choose to
adopt either Justice Ginsburg‘s atypical (to liberals) line of reasoning24 or
the approach of famously conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Accordingly, it is exceedingly unlikely that the addition of Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan will hasten the reversal of the Court‘s substantive
due process jurisprudence in the punitive damages realm.
Part I of this Article chronicles and summarizes the development of the
Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.25 Over the past two
decades, the Court has increasingly constitutionalized various aspects of
punitive damages jurisprudence, using both procedural26 and substantive27
due process rationales. A set of three ―guideposts‖ has emerged that courts
are to use in determining whether a punitive damages award runs afoul of
constitutional guarantees.28
Part II outlines the multiple punishments problem that is currently
facing courts throughout the country and provides a brief overview of the
various failed attempts and current proposals to remedy this problem.29
Part III provides the factual and procedural background of Philip Morris,
culminating with the Oregon Supreme Court‘s affirmance of the $79.5
million jury verdict.30
Part III then analyzes and critiques the United States Supreme Court‘s
opinion in Philip Morris, including Justice Breyer‘s majority opinion and
22. See Greg Stohr, Sotomayor on High Court May Mean Looser Limits on Damage
Awards, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid
=ay2_LzqaXiQY (―Sotomayor‘s views on damages . . . are largely a mystery, with her few rulings
on the topic offering limited insight as to how she would rule as a justice. As with other business
issues, she has eschewed sweeping legal theories, instead taking a case-by-case approach.‖).
23. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Memos Reveal Elena Kagan‟s Centrist Side, POLITICO (May 12,
2010, 4:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37119.html (reporting that Kagan
encouraged President Bill Clinton to take centrist positions during her work in the Clinton
administration); Steve LeVine & Theo Francis, Sotomayor: A Moderate on Business
Issues, BUSINESSWEEK (May 26, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnfla
sh/content/may2009/db20090526_819200.htm (claiming that Sotomayor ―has earned a centrist
reputation in business cases‖).
24. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg‘s federalism concern is atypical of liberal appointees and apparently
stems from the same methodological concern that prompted her to be critical of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), claiming that an already-moving political process is preferable to ―[h]eavy-handed
judicial intervention‖ in establishing a specific substantive due process framework. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 385–86 (1985).
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra Part I.C.2.a.i–iii.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.A.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2

6

Gash: The End Of An Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punit

2011]

THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD

531

the three dissenting opinions, the Oregon Supreme Court‘s ruling on
remand, and the telling response of the United States Supreme Court to
Philip Morris‘ subsequent writ of certiorari.31 Part III also briefly analyzes
Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker and explains why what did not happen
in that case is quite significant.32
Part IV then deconstructs and reconstructs the Court‘s current punitive
damages jurisprudence, examining the current makeup of the Court and
analyzing whether there is reason to believe that the addition of Justices
Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan might provide any restraining
influence on the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.33 Part IV then
concludes that given the balance of power on the Court, and given the
Court‘s indirect ―fix‖ of the multiple punishments problem, the Court is
unlikely to take any more punitive damages cases in the near future.34
I. CONSTITUTIONALIZING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages have long been an important fixture in tort law,
tracing their origins back to the Code of Hammurabi, which was written
nearly 4,000 years ago.35 Likewise, punitive damages have long been
accepted as a part of the American common law.36 There is universal
agreement that their purpose is to punish and deter reprehensible conduct.37
These objectives have historically been served exclusively by the states,38
with little or no discussion of federal constitutional considerations, and
without involvement by the United States Supreme Court. This all changed
in the late 1980s.

31. See infra Part III.B.2.–D.
32. See infra Part III.E.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part IV.C.
35. See Owen, supra note 1, at 368 (explaining that this earliest form of punitive damages
was calculated through the use of a predetermined scale and called ―multiple damages‖).
36. See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1123–24 (2005).
37. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) (citing BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)) (stating that the Court has ―long made clear‖ that a state
may use punitive damages for the purposes of punishment and deterrence); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1), at 29–30 (5th ed. 2005) (claiming that the most frequent purposes
of punitive damages cited by courts, legislatures, commentators, and plaintiffs‘ counsel are
punishment and deterrence). But see Owen, supra note 1, at 373–74 (suggesting a total of five
objectives of punitive damages: (1) retribution; (2) education; (3) deterrence; (4) compensation; and
(5) law enforcement).
38. See Rustad, supra note 17, at 468 (lamenting that the Court has now federalized the
punitive damages remedy through its substantive due process jurisprudence after two hundred years
of deference to the states).
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A. The Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Apply to Punitive
Damages
The first time the Supreme Court grappled at any level with the
constitutionality of punitive damages was in 1989 in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.39 In that case, the Court
was presented with the question of whether a punitive damages award in a
civil case implicated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.40 After reviewing the history and development of the
Excessive Fines Clause,41 the Court concluded that ―[w]hatever the outer
confines of the Clause‘s reach may be, we now decide only that it does not
constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages awarded.‖42 As it had done twice previously,43 the Court sidestepped the question as to whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes any constraints on punitive damages
awards,44 and it concluding that the petitioner had waived this argument by
failing to raise it below.45
39. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
40. Id. at 259. The Eighth Amendment provides: ―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262–68.
42. Id. at 263–64. This language suggests that when the punitive damages award (or a portion
thereof) goes to the government (as opposed to private litigants), the Excessive Fines Clause might
be implicated. Accord id. at 298–99 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―I
also note that by relying so heavily on the distinction between governmental involvement and
purely private suits, the Court suggests (despite its claim . . . that it leaves the question open) that
the Excessive Fines Clause will place some limits on awards of punitive damages that are recovered
by a governmental entity.‖); id. at 275 n.21 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 485 (1989) (―While our opinion in Halper implies that punitive damages awarded to the
Government in a civil action may raise Eighth Amendment concerns, that case is materially
different from this one, because the Government was exacting the punishment in a civil action,
whereas here the damages were awarded to a private party.‖); see also Margaret Meriwether
Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407, 422–28
(reviewing the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause); Philip Morris, 549
U.S. at 359 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I continue to agree with Justice O‘Connor and those
scholars who have concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to punitive damages
awards regardless of who receives the ultimate payout.‖). But see Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262
(―Given that the [Eighth] Amendment is addressed to bail, fines, and punishments, our cases long
have understood it to apply primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and
punishments.‖ (emphasis added)); id. at 268 (―[T]he history of the Eighth Amendment convinces us
that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and
payable to, the government.‖).
43. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828–29 (1986); Banker‘s Life & Cas.
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76–80 (1988).
44. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 259 n.1 (noting that while the petitioners challenged the
award on due process grounds, the Court declined to reach that issue).
45. Id. at 277. Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, however, indicated how
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B. Procedural Due Process Places Constitutional Limits on
Punitive Damages Awards
1. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
It took only two years for the Court to revisit the issue it declined to
address in Browning-Ferris. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip,46 the Court squarely addressed the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause constrained punitive
damages awards. In Haslip, the Court explained that because the common
law approach, whereby the jury‘s initial determination of whether to
impose punitive damages (and in what amount) was reviewable for
reasonableness by both trial and appellate courts,47 pre-dated the
Fourteenth Amendment itself,48 and because no state or federal court had
ever found this approach violated due process,49 the common law approach
was not per se unconstitutional.50 The Court did caution, however, that
vesting either the jury or a judge with unlimited discretion in setting a
punitive damages award could cause ―extreme results that jar one‘s
constitutional sensibilities.‖51

they would ultimately resolve this question. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring) (―I join the Court‘s opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a
holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases
brought by private parties.‖). These Justices even previewed the test the Court would eventually
adopt:
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible
civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause
forbids damages awards that are ―grossly excessive,‖ or ―so severe and oppressive
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.‖
Id. at 280–81 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111
(1909); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919)); see also
OWEN, supra note 36, § 18.6, at 1211 & n.92 (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 n.21
(majority opinion); id. at 298–99 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Calvin
R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987) (questioning the constitutionality, in light of Browning-Ferris, of
whether large punitive damages violate the Eighth Amendment); Stephen R. McAllister, A
Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 761
(1995). For a discussion of whether it is unconstitutional for the state to take a portion of the
punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff, see Sharon G. Burrows, Apportioning a Piece of a
Punitive Damages Award to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled with Punitive
Damages Goals and the Takings Clause?, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 437, 455–66 (1992).
46. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 17 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 369–73 (1851)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 18.
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The Court disclaimed an interest in precisely differentiating between
―constitutionally acceptable and [] constitutionally unacceptable‖ levels of
discretion,52 observing instead that ―general concerns of reasonableness
and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury
properly enter into the constitutional calculus.‖53 The Court then turned its
attention to the jury instructions given by the trial court and found that they
appropriately counseled the jury (1) to use punitive damages to punish and
deter the defendant; and (2) not to use punitive damages to compensate the
plaintiff for injury.54 The Court also found that Alabama‘s post-verdict
review process comported with due process because it ensured that the
punitive damages award was ―not grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the offense and ha[d] some understandable relationship to compensatory
damages.‖55
Both Justices Scalia and Sandra Day O‘Connor were sharply critical of
the Court‘s opinion—Scalia protesting that it went too far,56 and O‘Connor
objecting that it did not go far enough.57As would become a recurring
theme in the Court‘s punitive damages cases,58 Justice Scalia (though
concurring in the result of the case) chided the Court for providing
insufficient guidance to lower courts,59 and he offered the following
prescient lamentation: ―We have expended much ink upon the due-process
implications of punitive damages, and the fact-specific nature of the
Court‘s opinion guarantees that we and other courts will expend much
more in the years to come.‖60 In a lone dissent, Justice O‘Connor
complained that the lack of ―meaningful standards‖ given to the jury
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 19; see also id. at 20 (―As long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable
constraints, due process is satisfied.‖).
55. Id. at 22. In particular, the Alabama Supreme Court had previously identified its criteria
for assessing ―whether a punitive award is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and
retribution.‖ Id. at 21. These criteria were:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant‘s conduct as well as the harm that
actually occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct,
the duration of that conduct, the defendant‘s awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the
defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and
of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ―financial position‖ of the
defendant; (e) all the costs of the litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions
on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these
also to be taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21–22.
56. Id. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 44 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., infra note 205 and accompanying text.
59. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 39.
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violated due process.61 Foreshadowing the Court‘s later move into the
substantive due process realm, Justice O‘Connor criticized the majority
approach, declaring that Alabama‘s ―standardless discretion to juries is not
remedied by post hoc judicial review,‖ rather, at best, it ―tests whether the
award is grossly excessive. This is an important substantive due process
concern, but our focus here is on the requirements of procedural due
process.‖62
2. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg63
In what has been described as a ―trivial case,‖64 the Court again
revisited procedural due process in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,65 which
dealt with appellate review of punitive damages awards. In Oberg, the
Court invalidated as violative of procedural due process an amendment to
Oregon‘s constitution prohibiting ―judicial review of the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury ‗unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict.‘‖66 Observing that judicial
review of the amount of punitive damages has existed for as long as
punitive damages themselves,67 and finding that Oregon‘s minimal review
of such awards falls dramatically short of the scope of such review
afforded at common law,68 the Court concluded that the essentially
―unreviewable discretion‖ given to the jury in setting the amount of
punitive damages was a violation of procedural due process.69
C. Substantive Due Process Mandates that Punitive Damages Awards
Not Be Grossly Excessive
1. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
In a move that has been widely criticized,70 the Court veered into the
realm of substantive due process when it addressed whether a punitive
61. Id. at 43 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 55–56 (emphasis added).
63. Chronologically speaking, this was not the Court‘s next punitive damages case. It is
analyzed at this point in the Article because, prior to Philip Morris, it was the Court‘s only other
procedural due process case.
64. See OWEN, supra note 36, at 1220.
65. 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
66. Id. (quoting OR. CONST. art.VII, § 3 (amended 1910)).
67. Id. at 421.
68. Id. at 426–27.
69. Id. at 435. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Matthew J. Macario, Constitutional
Law—Punitive Damage Awards and Procedural Due Process in Products Liability Cases—Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994), 68 TEMP. L. REV. 409 (1995).
70. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating his belief that the Constitution does not control the amount of punitive
damages and that the substantive due process framework is a creation of the Court); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that ―the
Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against ‗excessive‘ or ‗unreasonable‘
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damages award was ―grossly excessive‖ in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.,71 decided only two years after Haslip.72
In TXO, the jury awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages
and $10 million in punitive damages after finding TXO liable for common
law slander of title.73 On appeal, TXO challenged the constitutionality of
the punitive damages award, arguing that it violated due process because
the amount awarded was unconstitutionally excessive.74 Relying on a series
of cases nearly a century old,75 the plurality opinion declared that ―grossly
excessive‖ punitive damages awards violate due process.76 As it had
previously done in Haslip, the Court again disclaimed an ability to ―‗draw
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
awards of punitive damages‖ and that the Court‘s jurisprudence in this area ―is insusceptible of
principled application‖); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470–71 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing his refusal to recognize ―the existence of a so-called ‗substantive
due process‘ right that punitive damages be reasonable‖ despite his concurrence in the judgment);
Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (―A federalized democratic system should not tolerate so blatant a usurpation of
state legislative and judicial prerogatives by an unaccountable federal judicial body.‖); Rustad,
supra note 17, at 517 (―The constitutionalization of punitive damages is an unprecedented project
to convince the Court to ‗unmake‘ the tort law remedy of punitive damages.‖); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89 (2006) (arguing that the Court‘s move to substantive due process
is unsupported by history and precedent and is inconsistent with principles of construction found in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
71. 509 U.S. 443, 446, 454 (1993).
72. TXO was the Court‘s next punitive damages case after Haslip. See supra Part I.B.1.
73. TXO, 509 U.S. at 446.
74. Id. at 452. TXO also sought reversal on the grounds that (1) West Virginia did not
recognize a claim for slander of title; and (2) admission of out of state conduct to show TXO‘s
wrongful intent violated West Virginia evidence law. Id.; see also id. at 462 n.28
(―TXO . . . [further] contend[ed] that the admission of evidence of its alleged wrongdoing in other
parts of the country, as well as the evidence of its impressive net worth, led the jury to base its
award on impermissible passion and prejudice.‖). TXO also sought reversal on procedural due
process grounds. See id. at 446 (―The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether that
punitive damages award violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, either
because its amount is excessive or because it is the product of an unfair procedure.‖).
75. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919)
(recognizing some authority that the Due Process Clause limits civil damages awarded pursuant to
statutory scheme); Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490 (1915) (noting that the
monetary penalty could not be ―imposed without departing from the fundamental principles of
justice embraced in the recognized conception of due process of law‖); Standard Oil Co. v.
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912) (explaining the ability to fix an amount of fines is limited by
obligation to administer justice); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (―We can
only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed
are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.‖
(citing Coffey v. Harlan Cnty., 284 U.S. 659, 665 (1907))); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Seegers, 207
U.S. 73, 78 (1907) (―We know there are limits beyond which penalties may not go . . . .‖).
76. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 (pointing out that there was a clear majority of Justices that agreed
there was a substantive component to the due process clause that limited the size of a punitive
damages award).
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constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.‘‖77 Relying upon
(1) the amount of harm the plaintiff actually suffered; (2) the amount of
harm that TXO‘s conduct could have potentially caused the plaintiff;78 and
(3) the wealth and conduct of TXO, the Court concluded that the size of
the punitive damages award was not ―so ‗grossly excessive‘ as to be
beyond the power of the State to allow.‖79
Observing that the case was ―close and difficult,‖80 Justice Anthony
Kennedy provided the pivotal fifth vote in a separate concurrence, though
not without articulating his serious concern with the evolution of the
Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence:
A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to
relying upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to
a particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the
award violates the Constitution. This type of review, far from
imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could
become as fickle as the process it is designed to superintend.
Furthermore, it might give the illusion of judicial certainty
where none in fact exists, and, in so doing, discourage
legislative intervention that might prevent unjust punitive
awards.81
To Justice Kennedy, TXO‘s ―pattern and practice of fraud, trickery and
deceit‖82 overcame the massive 524:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive
damages.83
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment
only.84 While Justice Scalia allowed that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due
Process Clause ―incorporates certain substantive guarantees specified in
the Bill of Rights,‖ he steadfastly refused to accept that the Due Process
Clause ―contains the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive
punitive damages.‖85
77. Id. at 458 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
78. Id. at 460 (―It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the
defendant‘s conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded,
as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were
not deterred.‖). The Court in Philip Morris later clarified that the jury could only consider potential
harm to the plaintiff, and not to third parties. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354
(2007).
79. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462. The Court also summarily dismissed TXO‘s procedural due
process claim. See id. at 465–66. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Nancy G. Dragutsky,
Walking the Invisible Line of Punitive Damages: TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Res. Corp., 21 PEPP.
L. REV. 909 (1994).
80. TXO, 509 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 466–67.
82. Id. at 468–69 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 890 (W.
Va. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 467–68.
84. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 470–71. Justice Scalia further complained,
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Justice O‘Connor, joined by Justices Bryon White and Souter,
dissented, though not because the plurality had recognized a substantive
due process right.86 To the contrary, Justice O‘Connor made it clear that
there existed ―common ground that an award may be so excessive as to
violate due process.‖87 She dissented because she disagreed with the
plurality‘s method for determining whether such a violation existed and
from the result reached in the case.88 Justice O‘Connor, however, decried
the plurality‘s failure to ―erect[] . . . a single guidepost to help other courts
find their way through this area‖89 and accused the plurality of
―abandon[ing] all pretense of providing instruction and mov[ing] directly
into the specifics of this case.‖90 Justice O‘Connor further declared:
Our inability to discern a mathematical formula does not
liberate us altogether from our duty to provide guidance to
courts that, unlike this one, must address jury verdicts such as
this on a regular basis. On the contrary, the difficulty of the
matter imposes upon us a correspondingly greater obligation
to provide the most coherent explanation we can.91
2. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
Three years later, the Court responded to Justice O‘Connor‘s plea for
―guideposts‖ to help lower courts navigate the developing punitive
damages jurisprudence. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,92 a
majority of the Court for the first time seemed to take seriously the
criticisms leveled by some of its members in prior decisions, particularly
concerning its failure to provide lower courts with adequate guidance on
how to apply those decisions.93 What ultimately emerged from Gore is the

It is particularly difficult to imagine that ‗due process‘ contains the substantive
right not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages, since if it contains that it
would surely also contain the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive
fines, which would make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
superfluous in light of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
86. Id. at 480 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
93. See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 480 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 466–67 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the ―grossly excessive‖ standard is unhelpful and leaves reviewing
courts to their own subjective reasoning); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 37
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―[T]he ‗guidance‘ to the jury provided by the admonition that it
‗take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
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basic template that both trial and appellate courts now apply when
determining whether a jury‘s punitive damages award is ―grossly
excessive.‖
In Gore, a doctor sued BMW for fraud and deceptive trade practices in
Alabama state court after discovering that the ―new‖ BMW he bought from
a BMW dealer had actually been repainted prior to sale.94 BMW admitted
that the car had been repainted prior to sale and acknowledged its
nationwide policy of non-disclosure of pre-sale repairs not exceeding 3%
of the purchase price of the car.95 At trial, Dr. Gore sought to focus the jury
on BMW‘s conduct beyond his individual case and introduced, over
BMW‘s objections, evidence that BMW had sold 983 cars nationwide as
―new‖ even though the cars had been repainted prior to sale; fourteen of
these 983 sales had occurred in Alabama.96 Even though BMW introduced
evidence that its disclosure policy complied with the most stringent
statutory requirements in the country,97 the jury awarded Gore $4,000 in
compensatory damages98 and $4 million in punitive damages.99
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the jury had
impermissibly calculated the punitive damages award by multiplying
Gore‘s $4,000 in compensatory damages by the number of cars BMW had
sold nationwide without disclosing they had been repainted.100 The
Alabama Supreme Court then determined that a constitutionally reasonable
amount of punitive damages was $2 million and issued a remittitur.101
Declaring that ―a review of this case would help to illuminate ‗the
character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive
awards‘ of punitive damages,‖102 the United States Supreme Court granted
review.
Writing for a bare five-Justice majority,103 Justice Stevens first
acknowledged that states have ―considerable flexibility‖ in deciding the
amount of punitive damages allowable in individual cases,104 and only
necessity of preventing similar wrong.‘ That is not guidance but platitude.‖).
94. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563. The car had apparently been damaged by acid rain while in transit
from Germany to the United States. Id. at 563 n.1.
95. Id. at 563–64. This policy stemmed from BMW‘s internal survey of state law, which
revealed that no state statutorily required disclosure of pre-sale repairs costing less than 3% of the
purchase price of the car. Id. at 565.
96. Id. at 564.
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id. This amount equaled the reduction in value Gore claimed his car suffered due to the
repainting. Id. at 564.
99. Id. at 565.
100. Id. at 567.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994)).
103. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at
561.
104. Id. at 568.
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when the punitive damages award is ―grossly excessive‖ in relation to the
state interest sought to be vindicated by the award ―does it enter the zone
of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.‖105 Therefore, explained Justice Stevens, ―the federal
excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the
state interests that a punitive award is designed to serve.‖106 Once the state
interests are identified, the inquiry then turns to whether the punitive
damages award is ―grossly excessive‖ in relation to those interests.107
The Court readily identified and approved of Alabama‘s state interest
in protecting its citizens from deceptive trade practices.108 And if the jury
had punished BMW only for failing to disclose that Gore‘s car had been
repainted, or perhaps only for non-disclosure in Alabama, that very well
might have ended the state interest inquiry. But the jury was instead
allowed, even encouraged, to punish BMW for each instance in which it
sold a repainted car as ―new‖ nationwide.109 Because Alabama‘s state
interest is limited to protecting Alabama citizens, its punishment of
extraterritorial conduct, the Court decided, impermissibly infringed upon
the sovereignty of other states.110
This is true, reasoned Justice Stevens, because the wide-ranging, presale disclosure requirements among the various states111 created a
substantial risk that the Alabama jury‘s punitive damages award based
upon nationwide sales punished conduct that was actually lawful where it
occurred.112 Inflicting such punishment plainly exceeded a state‘s
legitimate authority.113 ―To punish a person because he has done what the
law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic
sort.‖114 Consequently, punitive damages awards ―must be supported by
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 574.
108. Id. at 568–69, 573–74.
109. Id. at 572–74. In fact, the size of the punitive damages award, $4 million, was almost
exactly the mathematical product of the amount of compensatory damages awarded Gore ($4,000)
multiplied by the total number of repainted cars sold as ―new‖ throughout the United States (983).
Id. at 564.
110. Id. at 572–74; see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (―Laws have no
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and can have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other States.‖).
111. Gore, 517 U.S. at 569 n.13. The Court, in footnote 13, summarized a ―patchwork of rules
representing the diverse policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 states.‖ Id. at 569 n.13, 570.
112. Id. at 572–73.
113. Id. (―Alabama does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful
where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents.‖).
114. Id. at 573 n.19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). The Court
also noted that not only may Alabama not use punitive damages awards to punish conduct lawful in
other states, it is also not permitted to use punitive damages ―to deter conduct that is lawful in other
jurisdictions.‖ Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own
economy.‖115 Having limited the scope of the conduct that could be
legitimately considered in determining whether the punitive damages
award was sufficiently tethered to Alabama‘s state interest so as not to be
―grossly excessive‖ in relation to that interest, the Court then turned its
attention to the important task of describing how to determine whether the
award is ―grossly excessive.‖116
a. Establishment of Guideposts
Starting with the premise that a due process challenge to the size of a
punitive damages award arises out of the defendant‘s claim of lack of
adequate notice, the Court cobbled together various statements made in
some of its earlier punitive damages opinions to erect three ―guideposts‖ to
assist in determining whether a defendant had adequate notice of the fact
that the conduct engaged in is punishable and that the punishment is
potentially severe.117 If the defendant does not receive adequate notice,
there may be a due process violation.118 The three guideposts the Court
erected are (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct;
(2) the ratio between the compensatory damages and punitive damages;
and (3) the difference between the authorized civil and criminal penalties
for such conduct and the punitive damages award.119
i. Degree of Reprehensibility
With respect to the first guidepost, the Court stated that the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct is the ―most important indicium
of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.‖120As guidance for this
guidepost, the Court enumerated a variety of factors to be considered when
assessing reprehensibility, including (1) whether the harm suffered was
economic versus physical; (2) whether the defendant‘s conduct evinced a
reckless disregard for the health and safety of others; (3) whether the
conduct was intentional, malicious, deceitful, or performed through
trickery (as opposed to merely negligently or innocently); (4) whether the
115. Id. at 572. As found by the Alabama Supreme Court, however, the punitive damages
award in Gore was ―based in large part on conduct that happened in other jurisdictions.‖ Id. at 573
(quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994)). To its credit, the
Alabama Supreme Court had recognized that such reliance upon extraterritorial conduct was
improper, and purported to base its remittitur (from $4 million to $2 million) solely upon conduct
occurring within Alabama. Id. at 573–74.
116. Id. at 574.
117. Id. at 574–75.
118. Id.
119. Id. For a detailed analysis of Gore and its guideposts, see Sabrina C. Turner, Note, The
Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 427, 438–445.
120. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
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target of the conduct was vulnerable; and (5) whether the defendant had
repeatedly engaged in the conduct while knowing it was wrongful.121
ii. Ratio
Relying on the ―long pedigree‖ of the ―principle that exemplary
damages must bear a ‗reasonable relationship‘ to compensatory
damages,‖122 the second guidepost was the ratio between the size of the
compensatory damages and the size of the punitive damages.123 Adhering
to its prior rejection of any binding mathematical formula, the Court did
attempt to provide some additional guidance in distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible ratios. Generally speaking, offered the
Court, when compensatory damages are low, it is permissible for the ratio
to be higher than otherwise would be allowed, and higher ratios are
constitutionally permissible when either the injury is difficult to detect or
when monetary damages are difficult to determine.124 The Court then
(unhelpfully) added that when the amount of a punitive damages award is
―breathtaking,‖ it ―must surely ‗raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.‘‖125
iii. Other Sanctions
The third guidepost instructs courts to evaluate ―the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct‖ in relation to
the size of the punitive damages award at issue.126 The rationale behind
121. Id. at 575–77. The Court‘s approach to determining whether punitive damages are
appropriate parallels that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which counsels juries to consider
―the character of the defendant‘s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the
defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2). The Restatement (Second) approach is followed by most states. See OWEN, supra
note 36, at 1187.
122. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
123. Id. The Court also clarified that the appropriate measure of compensatory damages
includes not only those actually suffered but also those potentially suffered due to the defendant‘s
conduct. Id. at 582. This statement by the Court would later become a point of controversy in Philip
Morris, causing the Court to once again attempt to clarify the scope of potential damages that could
be considered in calculating the ratio. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
124. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
125. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993)
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting)); see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 364 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence as
―less than crystalline‖). See generally Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive
Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1797
(1997) (arguing that Gore represents an ad hoc, constitutionally unsound decision by the Court); F.
Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2008) (arguing that the framework the Court introduced in
Gore ―has made the process less fair and reliable because the Court‘s decisions have shown a lack
of clarity and consistency, an inadequate basis in terms of theory and policy, and an ad hoc
approach to the application and construction of the framework.‖).
126. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. Later, in State Farm, the Court downplayed the importance of
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this guidepost is that courts should afford state legislatures a degree of
deference in setting appropriate penalties for various types of conduct.127
b. Analysis of Guideposts
The Court‘s application of the three guideposts to the facts was
straightforward. With respect to the degree of BMW‘s reprehensibility, the
Court found BMW‘s conduct to be not particularly reprehensible, noting
that (1) Gore‘s harm was ―purely economic,‖ and not physical;128 (2) the
fact that Gore‘s car had been repainted did not affect its safety or
performance;129 (3) BMW‘s failure to disclose was not properly
characterized as a ―deliberate false statement[]‖;130 (4) while BMW‘s
nondisclosure policy was intentional, it complied with the strictest state
disclosure statutes;131 and (5) the policy was immediately changed after
being found wrongful for the first time.132 Consequently, the Court
determined that BMW‘s conduct exhibited ―none of the circumstances
ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct,‖ and thus ―was
not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million
exemplary damages award.‖133
As to the ratio guidepost, the Court hearkened back to an observation
in Haslip that ―a punitive damages award of ‗more than 4 times the amount
of compensatory damages‘ might be ‗close to the line‘‖134 as the
foundation for its conclusion that the 500:1 ratio presented in this case was
so ―breathtaking‖ as to ―raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.‖135
Finally, with respect to the comparable sanctions guidepost, the Court
concluded that BMW had insufficient notice that its nondisclosure policy
could subject it to a multimillion-dollar punishment because Alabama‘s
maximum authorized civil penalty for the conduct at issue was a mere
$2,000.136

criminal penalties by stating that although the existence of a criminal penalty can demonstrate how
seriously a state considers an act, it has little usefulness in determining dollar amounts. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003).
127. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
128. Id. at 576.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 579.
131. Id. at 578.
132. Id. at 579.
133. Id. at 580.
134. Id. at 581 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)).
135. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993)
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting)).
136. Id. at 584.
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In light of the preceding application of the guideposts to the facts of
Gore, the Court, for the first time in its history,137 invalidated a punitive
damages award on substantive due process grounds.138
Though he joined the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a separate
concurrence, explaining that it was ―important to explain why [the State‘s
entitlement to a strong] presumption of validity [was] overcome in this
instance.‖139 In his view, the presumption of validity otherwise afforded to
the award was overcome because the legal standards in place in Alabama,
as interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court, ―provided no significant
constraints or protection against arbitrary results.‖140
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, unsurprisingly wrote a
blistering dissent, accusing the majority of ―federalizing yet another aspect
of our Nation‘s legal culture,‖ and adopting a ―new rule of constitutional
law [that] is constrained by no principle other than the Justices‘ subjective
assessment of the ‗reasonableness‘ of the award in relation to the conduct
for which it was assessed.‖141 Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for
giving ―virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and federal
courts, as to what a ‗constitutionally proper‘ level of punitive damages
might be.‖142 He further mocked that the three guideposts ―mark a road to
nowhere‖ and ―provide no real guidance at all.‖143
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also filed a
dissenting opinion,144 complaining that the Court improperly invaded state
territory, offered only vague standards, and characterized the ultimate
guidance given to lower courts as nothing more than ―a ‗raised eyebrow‘
test.‖145
137. Id. at 586; id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[T]oday‘s judgment represents the first
instance of this Court‘s invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply unreasonably
large . . . .‖); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430–31 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting that Gore was the first time the Court ―invalidated a state-court punitive
damages assessment as unreasonably large‖).
138. The Court found that while both compensatory and punitive damages were justified in
this case, the $2 million punitive damages award was grossly excessive in relation to the state
interest the award was designed to serve. Gore, 517 U.S. at 585. For an interesting economic
analysis of the reasonableness of the jury‘s punitive damages award in Gore, see A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
901–02 (1998) (concluding that the award was grossly excessive).
139. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586–87 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices O‘Connor and Souter joined
Justice Breyer‘s concurrence. Id. at 586.
140. Id. at 588. This could, in fact, be an attempt by Justice Breyer to add a procedural due
process element to the analysis, foreshadowing his majority opinion in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007).
141. Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 602.
143. Id. at 605.
144. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 612–13. Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have grown more
comfortable with this substantive due process approach over time, as he joined the majority opinion
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3. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
The Court‘s first opportunity to apply the guideposts it announced in
Gore came in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,146 a Utah case involving a bad faith claim arising out of a car
accident. In State Farm, Curtis Campbell caused an accident that killed one
and seriously injured another.147 In the ensuing wrongful death and
personal injury lawsuits against its insured, State Farm contested liability
and refused to settle the claims for Campbell‘s policy limits, even though
Campbell was clearly at fault.148 As expected, the jury found Campbell
liable and awarded the plaintiffs nearly $200,000.149 Though they had
previously promised otherwise,150 State Farm initially refused to pay the
amount of the award that exceeded the policy limits,151 instead advising the
Campbells to sell their house to pay the excess judgment.152
Though ultimately State Farm agreed to pay the judgment in full,153 in
the meantime, the Campbells reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in the
underlying suit whereby the Campbells agreed to pursue a bad faith claim
against State Farm and to pay the plaintiffs most of what was recovered in
such an action.154 In exchange, the plaintiffs agreed not to collect on the
verdict against the Campbells.155
In the ensuing bad faith case, the trial court bifurcated the trial into two
different phases, with the first phase focusing upon whether State Farm had
acted in bad faith in the underlying case.156 The second phase, if necessary,
would decide the amount of compensatory and punitive damages, if any,
that would be awarded to the Campbells.157 During discovery, the
Campbells gathered evidence of other alleged bad acts by State Farm,

striking down a punitive damages award on substantive due process grounds in State Farm. See
infra note 169.
146. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
147. Id. at 412–13. In the accident, Todd Ospital was killed and Robert Slusher was
permanently disabled, though Campbell and his wife were uninjured. Id.
148. Id. at 413.
149. Id.
150. Id. State Farm had previously assured the Campbells that ―their assets were safe, that they
had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did
not need to procure separate counsel.‖ Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. The Campbells‘ policy provided that State Farm would pay up to $50,000, leaving the
Campbells responsible for the remainder of the award. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 414.
154. Id. at 413–14.
155. Id. at 413. Specifically, the Campbells agreed to pay the plaintiffs 90% of what was
recovered in the bad faith action and to allow the plaintiffs to play a major role in the decision
making in the bad faith case. Id. at 413–14.
156. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001).
157. Id.
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many of which were outside of Utah.158 The trial court granted State
Farm‘s motion to exclude this evidence from Phase I of the trial159 but
ruled that it could be admitted in Phase II if Phase II proved necessary.160
In Phase I, the jury found that State Farm‘s decision not to settle the
underlying case was unreasonable given the likelihood of a verdict in
excess of the Campbells‘ policy limits.161 In Phase II, State Farm
contended that its decision to take the underlying case to trial was an
―honest mistake.‖162 In contrast, the Campbells argued that State Farm‘s
decision was part of a ―national scheme‖ to defraud its policy holders and
to support their claim, thus presented evidence of numerous acts
committed by State Farm nationally.163 This evidence was admitted
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,164 which is
substantially identical to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.165
At the close of Phase II, ―[t]he jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.‖166 Though
―the trial court reduced [the damages] to $1 million and $25 million,
respectively,‖ the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive
damages award after applying the guideposts previously announced in
Gore.167
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the $145
million award was grossly excessive.168 Writing for the six-member
majority,169 Justice Kennedy declared the case to be ―neither close nor
difficult.‖170 Apparently dispensing with Gore‘s directive to carefully
identify and define Utah‘s governmental interest in the case,171 Justice
158. Id. at 1143.
159. Id. at 1156. The trial court carefully examined this evidence over the course of fifteen
days in conjunction with no less than ten pretrial hearings. See id. at 1157.
160. Id.
161. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414. Between Phases I and II, the Supreme Court decided BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). State Farm, 538 U.S. at 14. State Farm again
moved to exclude the evidence of other acts that occurred outside of Utah but was once again
denied. Id.
162. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1143.
163. Id. at 1143.
164. UTAH R. EVID. 404(b); Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1157.
165. UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee‘s note; see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1226
n.293.
166. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415.
167. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–575 (1996)). The
compensatory damages remained at $1 million. Id. at 426.
168. Id. at 429.
169. Id. at 411. Joining Justice Kennedy were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
O‘Connor, Souter, and Breyer. Id.
170. Id. at 418. This language is apparently used to contrast State Farm with TXO, in which
Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote in favor of affirming the punitive damages award, even
while describing that case as both ―close and difficult.‖ TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 468–69 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (―[J]udicially imposed punitive damages . . . must be supported
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Kennedy delved directly into the three guideposts identified in Gore. In the
context of the reprehensibility analysis, Justice Kennedy reiterated what
was made clear in Gore: ―A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct
that may have been lawful where it occurred.‖172 Unlike in Gore, however,
the Campbells conceded that much of the conduct reflected in the evidence
introduced in the bad faith case was lawful where it occurred.173
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rendered moot the lawful/unlawful
distinction, the importance of which had been left uncertain in Gore,174 by
declaring ―[n]or, as a general rule does a State have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts
committed outside of the State‘s jurisdiction.‖175 Using principles of
federalism as the foundation, Justice Kennedy declared that ―each State
may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or
proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within
its jurisdiction.‖176 Therefore, whether or not the extraterritorial conduct
was lawful or unlawful is irrelevant—the only conduct for which State
Farm could be legitimately punished in Utah state court is conduct that
took place in Utah. Unfortunately, however, this pronouncement did not
fully dispense with the case.177
Because the evidence introduced in Phase II of the bad faith case was
admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b), which allows for introduction of other
acts that are probative of, for example, motive or intent,178 the Court was
still faced with determining whether this evidence was admitted for
purposes other than punishment of State Farm. Though not clearly framed
by the Court, the simple question it had to decide was whether the
evidence of other acts was used to ascertain the level of reprehensibility of
State Farm‘s conduct vis-à-vis the Campbells, or was, instead, used to
punish State Farm.179 Justice Kennedy encountered little difficulty in
determining that ―[t]his case . . . was used as a platform to expose, and
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm‘s operations throughout
the country.‖180 While acknowledging that even ―[l]awful out-of-state
by the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy.‖); supra notes 106–07
and accompanying text.
172. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 572).
173. Id. at 422.
174. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text; see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1234.
175. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 422 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 569). This means, of course, that a punitive damages
award of any size that punishes a defendant for extraterritorial acts is per se unconstitutional as a
violation of federalism principles. Such a violation could, however, still be harmless error.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
179. See Gash, supra note 7, at 1234.
180. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 420; see also id. (―The Utah Supreme Court‘s opinion makes
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conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and
culpability of the defendant‘s action in the State where it is tortious,‖181
Justice Kennedy insisted that such conduct ―must have a nexus to the
specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.‖182
Of critical importance to the later-decided Philip Morris case (and
more generally), Justice Kennedy then acknowledged, albeit somewhat
obliquely, that the lurking presence of the multiple punishments problem183
was driving the decision. In the wake of his discussion of why principles of
federalism prohibit state courts from punishing extraterritorial conduct,
Justice Kennedy seized hold of what he characterized as ―a more
fundamental reason‖ for the decision.184 A full understanding and
appreciation of this ―reason‖ that is ―more fundamental‖ than federalism is
critical to an understanding of the Philip Morris case decided a few years
later.
Justice Kennedy began with the implied (though mistaken) premise
that only prior bad acts that are similar to the conduct at issue in the case
can be properly admitted as other acts evidence.185 Consequently, reasoned
Justice Kennedy, dissimilar acts cannot serve as the basis for a punitive
damages award.186 His explicit rationale for this conclusion was that ―[a]
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not
for being an unsavory individual or business.‖187 Adding a constitutional
exclamation point, Justice Kennedy continued: ―Due process does not
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties‘ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the
explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct
directed toward the Campbells.‖); id. (―[T]he Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm‘s
decision to take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by
capping payouts on claims company wide.‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id.
(―This was, as well, an explicit rationale of the trial court‘s decision in approving the award.‖); id.
(―[T]he Campbells demonstrated, through the testimony of State Farm employees who had worked
outside of Utah, and through expert testimony, that this pattern of claims adjustment under the
PP&R program was not a local anomaly, but was a consistent, nationwide feature of State Farm‘s
business operations, orchestrated from the highest levels of corporate management.‖ (alteration in
original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 120a, State Farm, 538 U.S. 408 (No. 01-1289)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. Id. at 422.
182. Id.
183. See generally infra Part II.
184. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422–23.
185. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422 (―A defendant‘s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.‖); id. at 423
(―[E]vidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive
damages . . . .‖); see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1246 (explaining that the language of Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b) ―does not require other acts to be similar in order to be admissible . . . because
other acts are occasionally highly probative for a proper purpose even in the absence of similarity‖).
186. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422–23.
187. Id. at 423.
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guise of the reprehensibility analysis . . . .‖188 Due process does not allow
this, declared Justice Kennedy, because ―[p]unishment on these bases
creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct.‖189 As authority for this critically important constitutional
pronouncement, Justice Kennedy cited a concurrence in Gore written by
Justice Breyer190—the author of the majority opinion in Philip Morris.191
Concluding that the Campbells were unable to identify much, if any,
evidence of repeated misconduct that was similar to that which injured
them,192 Justice Kennedy declared the conduct that harmed the Campbells
to be ―the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis.‖193 And
while finding State Farm‘s handling of the Campbells‘ case justified an
award of punitive damages, Justice Kennedy concluded that a ―more
modest‖ award would have satisfied Utah‘s legitimate interests.194
Foreshadowing its decision in Philip Morris, the Court also explained
that in order to prevent a jury from using evidence of out-of-state conduct
to punish a defendant, it must be instructed on the proper use of such
evidence.195
On the second Gore guidepost, the Court once again disclaimed an
interest in drawing a bright line between the constitutionally permissible
and impermissible ratios between punitive damages and compensatory
damages.196 The Court did, however, come closer than it ever previously
had to drawing such lines, declaring that ―few awards exceeding a singledigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process.‖197 Backpedaling a bit, the Court allowed
that such ratios (1) can be higher when particularly reprehensible conduct
causes only modest compensatory damages, and (2) may not
constitutionally exceed even a one to one ratio when compensatory
damages are substantial.198 Because the punitive damages award in this

188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
191. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
192. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
193. Id. at 424.
194. Id. at 419–20.
195. Id. at 422.
196. Id. at 424–25 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993)).
197. Id. at 425.
198. Id.
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case was 145:1,199 there was a strong presumption against its constitutional
validity.200
With respect to the final guidepost, the Court noted that it ―need not
dwell long‖ on it because ―[t]he most relevant civil sanction‖ in Utah was a
$10,000 sanction for fraud.201 When the conduct under consideration was
limited to that which harmed the Campbells, the Court concluded that a
single fine of $10,000 was ―dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages
award.‖202
When the conduct at issue was properly limited to that which harmed
the Campbells, the Court concluded that each of three guideposts pointed
toward a punitive damages award in the ballpark of the $1 million
compensatory damages award.203Accordingly, the Court reversed and
remanded the case to the Utah courts.204
Justice Scalia was brief (but not kind) in dissent, pronouncing the
Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence to be ―insusceptible of principled
application.‖205 Justice Thomas also filed a brief dissent, reiterating his
view that ―‗the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive
damages awards.‘‖206 Justice Ginsburg filed a more substantial opinion in
dissent, taking issue with the Court‘s recitation of the facts and its
application of the Gore guideposts.207
As demonstrated below, the prospect of defendants having to pay
multiple punitive damages awards for the same act or course of conduct
has been the driving force behind the Supreme Court‘s recent substantive
199. Id. at 426. While the jury‘s verdict originally consisted of $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court‘s
reduction of the compensatory damages to $1 million. Id. at 408, 420, 426.
200. Id. at 426.
201. Id. at 428 (stating that a comparison to criminal penalties has little usefulness in
determining dollar amounts but that the existence of a criminal penalty does demonstrate how
serious a state considers an act).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 429.
204. Id. On remand, the Supreme Court of Utah reduced the punitive damage award to
approximately $9 million, utilizing the maximum nine-to-one ratio that the Supreme Court seemed
to allow in State Farm. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410 (Utah 2004).
As was instructed by the Supreme Court in State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court based its award
solely on State Farm‘s ―behavior that affected the Campbells and took place within Utah.‖ Id. at
413. The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari filed following the Utah case.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 98 P.3d 409 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (Oct.
4, 2004) (No. 04–116).
205. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
207. See id. at 430–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, Ginsburg emphasized the details
of State Farm‘s wrongdoing and agreed with the Utah Supreme Court that State Farm‘s conduct was
―egregious and malicious.‖ Id. at 436. She further took issue with the Court‘s dismissal of these
relevant facts. Id. at 437. Unlike in Gore, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Justice
Ginsburg‘s dissent. Id. at 430.
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due process punitive damages jurisprudence. Indeed, as demonstrated in
Part III, the so-called ―multiple punishments problem‖ directly led to the
questionable opinion in Philip Morris.208 Accordingly, a full understanding
of the nature and extent of this problem is vital to understanding Philip
Morris and why this author is convinced that the Supreme Court is done
tinkering with punitive damages.
II. THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS PROBLEM209
State and federal courts, state and federal legislatures, a substantial
number of legal commentators, and countless lawyers representing both
plaintiffs and defendants all recognize that our torts system has a major
problem—how to deal with the multiple punishments problem.210 This
topic has prompted (1) a great number of majority and dissenting opinions
in both state211 and federal212 courts; (2) a wide variety of publications,
208. See infra Part III.
209. This problem is also occasionally referred to as ―the multiple punitive damages problem.‖
See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1032 n.123 (1999).
210. For a comprehensive analysis of this problem and a proposed comprehensive solution, see
generally Gash, supra note 9. Much of the discussion and many of the citations in this section
outlining the contours of this problem closely resembles my earlier research on this subject
contained in the cited article.
211. See, e.g., Ex parte Holland, 692 So. 2d 811, 816–19 (Ala. 1997) (pointing out the
potential for the first plaintiff in a multiple-claimant tort case to impair the ability of the remaining
members to protect their interests but refusing to use mandatory class actions to deal with the
problem); Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965, 972 (Cal. 2003)
(recognizing the unfairness of multiple punishment and suggesting a ―non-opt out‖ class action
solution); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 397, 403 (Ill. 1990) (expressing concern
for the imposition of multiple punitive damages and its effect on manufacturers and their economic
contributions to society); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa
1994) (recognizing the seriousness of multiple punitive damages and calling for a national
solution); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 478, 480 (N.J. 1986) (stating there
should be safeguards against multiple punitive damages, including offering evidence of prior
punitive damages award to the jury); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35,
48 (Tex. 1998) (holding that other impositions of punitive damages should be considered when
assessing punitive damage awards but stopping short of declaring multiple punitive damages
unconstitutional); Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Life Ins. Co., 600 S.E.2d 346, 361 (W. Va. 2004)
(discussing the potential problems with multiple impositions of punitive damages); Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457–61 (Wis. 1980) (emphasizing the need for close judicial control
of multiple punitive damages awards).
212. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[B]oth state and federal
courts have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national
problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products.‖), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993);
Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1989) (declaring that a national rule on the
issue of multiple punitive damages is necessary); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 841–42 (2d Cir. 1967) (explaining the problem of multiple punitive damages and recognizing
courts‘ limits in solving the problem); In re N. Dist. of Calif. ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prod. Liab.
Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 895, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (pointing out ―[t]he potential abuse
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including law review articles from leading commentators;213 (3) numerous
state statutes;214 (4) multiple failed attempts at federal legislation;215 and
(5) a telling note of caution from the United States Supreme Court.216
implicit in repeated awards of punitive damages‖), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982); McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1569–70 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(struggling with a resolution to the multiple punitive damages against the same defendant);
Campbell v. ACandS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D. Mont. 1989) (―[T]he continued imposition
of punitive damages serves no purpose within the contemplation of the statutory or common law of
Montana authorizing punitive damages.‖); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233,
1234–35 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that multiple punitive damages violate due process in certain
circumstances); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp, 717 F. Supp. 272, 284–85 (D.N.J. 1989)
(recognizing that ―awarding exemplary damages in successive asbestos litigations are thus
nationwide problems and call for a uniform solution.‖); In re ―Agent Orange‖ Prod. Liab. Litig, 100
F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (calling for a limit on the amount of times one defendant can be
punished for a single act or course of conduct), aff‟d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Maxey v.
Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing the problem with
unlimited exemplary damages in the design defect context), modified, reh‟g denied, 727 F.2d 350,
353 (5th Cir. 1984).
213. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971)
(warning that the multiple punitive damages problem ―might well lead to a re-examination of the
whole basis and policy of awarding punitive damages‖); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 583, 594 (2003) (―Numerous commentators have bemoaned this risk of unfair piling on,
dubbing it the ‗multiple punishment‘ problem.‖); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness
When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 931, 932–34 (describing the multiple punitive damages problem and pointing out the
inadequacy of any single court or state legislature to combat it); Gash, supra note 9, at 1624–26
(arguing that the effects of the multiple punishments problem may include bankruptcy of
defendants, under compensation of future plaintiffs, and ill effects to employees and stockholders of
the defendant company); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986) (recognizing the threat multiple punitive damage awards
pose on the viability of business entities); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44–47, 50 (1982)
(explaining the problems of measurement and control of punitive damages especially in products
liability litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 51–52 (1983) (discussing
the emergence and existing problem of multiple punitive damages); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 285 (1983)
(bemoaning the lack of jury instruction and cogent standards for assessing punitive damages).
214. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)(a)–(b) (2010) (disallowing punitive damages in
situations where the defendant has previously been assessed punitive damages for the same act or
single course of conduct, except when the court determines the prior award was insufficient
punishment); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2011) (allowing only one award of punitive
damages for any act or omission arising from products liability); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (2010)
(using other punitive and compensatory awards against a defendant as a factor in determining a
punitive damage award); MO. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (West 2010) (requiring that defendant be
credited with a prior punitive damage award by the amount previously paid for the same conduct);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B)(7) (LexisNexis 2011) (directing that when assessing punitive
damage awards, courts consider the total effect of other punitive damages award against the same
defendant for the same conduct giving rise to the claim); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(3) (2009)
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Judge Henry Friendly first identified and articulated the multiple
punishments problem in the 1960s, recognizing that ―[t]he legal difficulties
engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of
plaintiffs are staggering.‖217 Nearly a half century later, the problem
remains every bit as ―staggering‖ in breadth. Professor David Owen, a
leading commentator on punative damages, identified the question of
whether due process restrains multiple punitive damages awards as ―the
most momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court.‖218 Utah Senator
Orrin Hatch, an outspoken proponent of tort reform, has declared the
multiple punitive damages problem ―one of the most egregious and
unconscionable . . . abuses and excesses in our civil justice system.‖219
Even Professor Laurence Tribe, an equally outspoken supporter of punitive
damages,220 confesses that due process ought to limit the recovery of
(directing that when reviewing punitive damage awards, courts consider previous judgments for
punitive damages against the same defendant for the same conduct giving rise to the claim).
215. An early attempt to introduce punitive damages reform occurred in 1984. See Product
Liability Act: Hearing on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Committee on
Commerce Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong. 28 (1983). Members of the American Bar
Association criticized this proposal declaring, ―[W]e have rejected much more radical suggestions
that have been made, such as allowing only one punitive damages award and then deeming the
company sufficiently punished. Such a provision was at one time part of proposed federal product
legislation but eventually dropped as patently unfair, since the first verdict might be a small one or
one maneuvered by the defendant.‖ SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES SEC. OF LITIG., AMER.
BAR ASS‘N., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 7-2 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A.
REPORT] (citing the 1984 proposal). Still, later attempts were unsuccessfully made. See Multiple
Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1995, S. 671, 104th Cong. (1995); Multiple Punitive Damages
Fairness Act of 1997, S. 78, 105th Cong. (1997).
216. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (strongly
implying that due process imposes limits on multiple punitive damages awards).
217. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
218. Owen, supra note 1, at 406; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612
n.4 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (confirming the open status of the multiple punishment
problem by saying, ―Petitioner invites the Court to address the question of multiple punitive
damages awards stemming from the same alleged misconduct. The Court does not take up the
invitation, and rightly so, in my judgment, for this case does not present the issue.‖); Colby, supra
note 213, at 587 (characterizing the multiple punishment problem as ―the single most discussed and
debated issue in the law of punitive damages‖); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 432 (2003) (―The multiple punishments problem has
confounded jurists and scholars for the better part of the past three decades.‖); Victor E. Schwartz
& Leah Lorber, Death by a Thousand Cuts: How to Stop Multiple Imposition of Punitive Damages,
BRIEFLY . . . : PERSP. ON LEGIS, REG, AND LITIG, Dec. 2003, at 1, 8–9 (―A major problem in our
liability system is the multiple imposition of punitive damages.‖).
219. 143 CONG. REC. S454 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
220. Professor Tribe has argued numerous cases in support of punitive damages awards. See,
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S.
408 (2003) (No. 01-1289) (arguing for the respondent that punitive damages were not excessive);
Transcript of Oral Argument, Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644),
1994 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 150, at *30–31 (arguing for respondents seeking to uphold the punitive
damage award); Transcript of Oral Argument, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993) (No. 92-479), 1993 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 178, at *25–26 (arguing for respondents seeking
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multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct through ―some
double jeopardy-like doctrine.‖221 The American Law Institute,222 the
American Bar Association,223 and the American Association of Trial
Lawyers have all gone on the record agreeing that this is a significant
problem.224 Nevertheless, the solution to this ongoing problem has proven
elusive.225 There is a clear consensus that any comprehensive solution must
be accomplished on a national, rather than state, level.226
The multiple punishments problem has only emerged in the latter half
of the 20th Century because it was during this time that legal and
technological changes combined to give rise to the modern mass tort claim.
By definition, the multiple punishments problem can only arise when the
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards against a defendant for a
to uphold the punitive damage award).
221. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, State Farm, 583 U.S. 408 (No. 01-1289)
(colloquy between Justice Stevens and Professor Tribe).
222. 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS‘ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
260–65 (1991).
223. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 215, at 7-1.
224. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20–26 (1989).
225. See Owen, supra note 1, at 383 (lamenting that, ―[T]his very serious problem of repetitive
punitive damage awards remains to date a problem without a satisfactory judicial or legislative
resolution.‖). For a thorough discussion of this problem and a proposed comprehensive solution to
this problem, see generally Gash, supra note 9.
226. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[B]oth state and federal
courts have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national
problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products.‖), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58, 62 (3d
Cir. 1993); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 1989) (declaring that a national
rule on the issue of multiple punitive damages is necessary); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp, 717
F. Supp. 272, 284–85 (D.N.J. 1989) (recognizing that ―awarding exemplary damages in successive
asbestos litigations are thus nationwide problems and call for a uniform solution‖); In re N. Dist. of
Calif. ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 895, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(discussing the potential for abuse implicit in a multiplicity of punitive damages awards and calling
for nationwide solution to remedy this abuse), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing
the seriousness of multiple punitive damages and calling for a national solution); Multiple Punitive
Damages Fairness Act of 1997, S. 78, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S454 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1997) (―The only effective means of addressing these problems is through a nationwide solution,
which the legislation I introduce today would provide.‖) (Statement of Sen. Hatch); A.B.A. REPORT,
supra note 215, at 7-2, 7-8 (concluding that national legislation is needed with respect to the
multiple punitive damages problem); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 20–21
(calling for a national solution to the problem); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 218, at 10, 17–20
(―[A] uniform remedy for the problems posed by multiple punitive damages awards can be
effectively achieved only at the federal level . . . .‖); Denemark, supra note 213, at 932–33
(proposing common law solution from the judiciary); Owen, supra note 1, at 406 n.152 (―In the
absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts continue to struggle with the problem as best they
can.‖); Owen, supra note 213, at 50 (arguing for increased judicial control over multiple punitive
damages awards); Wheeler, supra note 213, at 276 (bemoaning the absence of clear Supreme Court
guidance on ―whether the procedures by which punitive damages have been awarded to private
plaintiffs satisfy the dictates of due process‖).
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single act or course of conduct exists. In the vast majority of tort cases, one
plaintiff sues one defendant for injuries arising out of the defendant‘s
actions; for example, a car accident.227 Even if the defendant‘s conduct is
sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to punitive damages, once the
underlying case is resolved, the defendant cannot be sued or otherwise
punished civilly again for that same conduct. It is only when a defendant‘s
act or course of conduct injures multiple plaintiffs that the defendant is
exposed to the risk of multiple lawsuits and multiple punitive damages
awards. While it cannot be questioned that there were cases involving
multiple punitive damages awards prior to the latter half of the 20th
Century,228 those awards were very unusual and did not raise the level of
concern that such awards now raise. The largest factor in the substantial
rise in the number of cases implicating the multiple punishments problem
was the advent of products liability and other mass tort claims.229
One of the largest and most controversial types of mass tort claims
involves the potential liability of tobacco manufacturers for the injuries and
deaths of thousands, if not millions, of cigarette smokers. Though brought
as an individual action in the wake of the death of a cigarette smoker, the
case of Philip Morris USA v. Williams230 has deep and far-reaching
consequences for mass tort law; it also placed before the United States
Supreme Court, once again, the multiple punishments problem.
III. PHILIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS
Philip Morris USA v. Williams arose when the widow and personal
representative of Jesse Williams‘ estate (Williams) brought an action
against cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris, Inc., seeking compensatory
and punitive damages for the death of her husband.231

227. See Seltzer, supra note 213, at 40 (―Typically, punitive damages claims arose from a
single incident involving only two parties, making it possible for a jury to determine an appropriate
award without considering the possibility of additional awards by other juries.‖). Accord Owen,
supra note 213, at 15 (―Punitive damages were developed largely as a punishment and deterrent for
trespassers, oxen thieves and other such human malefactors. When the device is transferred to the
complex bureaucracy of a modern manufacturing concern, the fit is awkward in many respects.‖);
cf. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 218, at 2 (―Multiple punishment for the same or similar conduct
did not exist at the time the Constitution was drafted and certainly cannot be sustained on the
grounds of ‗historical correctness.‘‖).
228. See, e.g., Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 291, 294 (Iowa 1917) (affirming punitive
damages awards in favor of both a young woman seduced by the defendant and her father and
declaring that, ―The fact that a defendant has or may be held liable for exemplary damages in one
case has never been held as a defense in his favor against liability for exemplary damages to another
plaintiff.‖); Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wisc. 1914) (affirming punitive damages awards in
favor of both a young woman seduced by the defendant and her father).
229. The first series of products liability lawsuits to gain national attention occurred in the
1960s and involved a drug used to treat arteriosclerosis, which had the known but undisclosed side
effects. See 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 37, § 9.5(A), at 558.
230. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
231. 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
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A. Factual and Procedural History
Williams began smoking Philip Morris cigarettes in the 1950s and
continued until his death in 1997.232 Williams died of lung cancer, which a
jury found was primarily caused by his years of smoking.233 Despite his
family‘s efforts to the contrary, Williams continued to smoke the
defendant‘s cigarettes because ―he had heard on television that cigarettes
do not cause cancer.‖234 Williams responded to his family‘s pleas for him
to stop ―by finding published assertions showing that cigarette smoking is
not dangerous.‖235 Upon learning he had cancer, Williams said, ―those darn
cigarette people finally did it. They were lying all the time.‖236
Despite a Surgeon General‘s report in 1964 that highlighted the
connection between smoking and lung cancer, Philip Morris continued to
―encourage the impression that there was a genuine and continuing
controversy‖ that the dangers of smoking were not clear.237 Williams
asserted that this type of publicity was fraudulent because Philip Morris
―knew that there was no legitimate controversy about the health effects of
smoking and that defendant itself had no doubt that cigarette smoking
carried serious health risks, including the risk of lung cancer.‖238
After a full trial, the jury found in favor of Williams on both negligence
and fraud grounds,239 awarding $21,485.80 in economic damages and
$800,000 for each claim in non-economic damages.240 With respect to the
negligence claim, the jury found Williams to be 50% at fault, and no
punitive damages were awarded for this claim.241 As for the fraud claim,
the jury awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages.242 The trial court
232. Id. at 829.
233. Id. at 829 n.4.
234. Id. Williams‘ wife and children repeatedly told him that cigarettes were bad for his health,
and his son attempted to give him articles that highlighted the dangers of smoking. Id.
235. Id. Williams ―insisted that the cigarette companies would not sell cigarettes if they were
as dangerous as his family claimed.‖ Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 833. ―In an internal memorandum shortly after the 1964 report, a Philip Morris vice
president explained that it was necessary to ‗provide some answers which will give smokers a
psychological crutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking.‘‖ Id. Furthermore, in the late 1970s
and 1980s, a director of research for Philip Morris said it was his job to ―fuel the controversy‖ as to
whether cigarettes were harmful. Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 831. Although Philip Morris and other tobacco companies conducted research on
tobacco, they purposefully avoided such research in the United States where they would have had to
document the results of the biological effects of tobacco use, instead opting to conduct their
research in Europe where results could be destroyed. Id. at 834, 839. This research was designed to
carefully avoid answering the question of whether cigarettes are harmful. Id. at 834. In the 1990s,
the tobacco industry was ―forced to agree‖ that tobacco may be a ―risk factor‖ associated with
numerous diseases. Id. Additionally, and despite evidence to the contrary, Philip Morris publicly
professed a belief that cigarettes were not addictive. Id.
239. Id. at 828.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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reduced that amount to $32 million, finding the amount to be ―excessive
under the United States Constitution.‖243 The trial court also reduced the
non-economic damages to $500,000 pursuant to Oregon state law.244
Both parties appealed.245 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court‘s remittitur, reinstating the original amount of punitive
damages.246 It rejected Philip Morris‘ claims that (1) the trial court failed to
instruct the jury not to punish Philip Morris for harm to nonparties and that
the ―award should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to
Williams‖; and (2) that the trial court‘s instruction that the maximum
amount that the jury could award was $100 million was flawed.247
In its decision to reinstate the $79.5 million punitive damages award,
the Court of Appeals evaluated Oregon‘s statutory ―criteria for an award of
punitive damages‖ to determine whether a punitive damages award of any
size was justified under the facts of the case.248 In this regard, Oregon law
established seven specific criteria for deciding in a products liability action
whether the plaintiff has proven by ―clear and convincing evidence that the
party against whom punitive damages are sought has acted with malice or
has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable
risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health,
safety and welfare of others.‖249 These seven criteria are:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise
from the defendant‘s misconduct; (b) The degree of the
defendant‘s awareness of that likelihood; (c) The profitability
of the defendant‘s misconduct; (d) The duration of the
misconduct and any concealment of it; (e) The attitude and
conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and (g) The total
deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the
defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not
limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations
similar to the claimant‘s and the severity of the criminal
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be
subjected.250
The court briefly analyzed these seven factors, finding that each of
them supported a punitive damages award. First, the court concluded that
the jury could have found that it was very likely that Philip Morris‘
243. Id.
244. Id. The reduction of the non-economic damages was in accordance with OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18.560(1) (West 1987), which has since been renumbered as OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710 (West
2011). See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006).
245. Williams, 48 P.3d at 828.
246. Id. at 843.
247. Id. at 837–38.
248. Id.
249. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (West 2010).
250. Id. § 30.925(2).
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―fraudulent statements‖ would be harmful.251 Second, the court determined
that the jury could have found that Philip Morris was aware of the potential
for harm by 1958 and was definitely aware of it by the 1970s.252 Third, the
court concluded that Philip Morris‘ scheme was highly advantageous to its
business because it was a lucrative industry, ultimately earning billions of
dollars:253 ―There is evidence that defendant believed, in fact, that its
misrepresentation of the dangers of smoking was important to its ability to
continue in the cigarette business.‖254 Fourth, the court noted that Philip
Morris‘ misconduct lasted more than forty years, and the defendant
concealed it for as long as possible.255 Fifth, the court found no evidence
that Philip Morris regretted its actions.256 Sixth, there was no dispute that
Philip Morris is quite wealthy.257 And seventh, there was no evidence that
Philip Morris had been previously punished for this misconduct.258
Having satisfied itself that an award of punitive damages was
appropriate, the court then proceeded to analyze whether the award was
excessive under either state or federal law.259 After chronicling the
evidence Williams introduced in support of the punitive damages claim,260
the court readily found sufficient evidence under Oregon‘s own ―rational
juror‖ standard to support the jury‘s original $79.5 million award.261 This
evidence included, inter alia, the fact that Philip Morris knew that smoking
was harmful while stating publicly that the issue was ―unresolved.‖262
251. Williams, 48 P.3d at 839.
252. Id. at 840.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Curiously, the court actually performed much of the state law excessiveness analysis
before first determining whether the punitive damages award itself was legitimate. See id. at 838–
39.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 836–38 (citing Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 477 (Or. 2001)). The
Oregon Supreme Court decided Parrott after the jury in Williams had reached its decision;
therefore, the trial court did not have the benefit of the Court‘s Parrott analysis to consider in its
determination to issue a remittitur. Id. at 836 n.16. The Parrott criteria are:
―(1) the statutory and common-law factors that allow an award of punitive damages
for the specific kind of claim at issue * * *; (2) the state interests that a punitive
damages award is designed to serve * * *; (3) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant‘s conduct * * *; (4) the disparity between the punitive damages award
and the actual or potential harm inflicted * * *; and (5) the civil and criminal
sanctions provided for comparable misconduct[.]‖
Id. at 836 (alteration in original) (quoting Parrot, 17 P.3d at 484) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
262. Id. at 838. Additional evidence presented by the plaintiff included: the defendant knew
nicotine was addictive; the defendant created ―controversy‖ to give highly addicted smokers a
reason to justify their habit; the defendant conducted research without looking into the relationship
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Next, the court of appeals considered the Oregon Supreme Court‘s
decision in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc.,263 as well as the Gore
guideposts.264 In light of all of the evidence, the court concluded that a
punitive damages award of $79.5 million was not unconstitutionally
excessive and therefore should not have been reduced by the trial court.265
On reconsideration, the court of appeals adhered to its opinion.266
Philip Morris then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court, which
the court denied.267 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded the case ―in light of State Farm Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Campbell.‖268
On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals reexamined the case in light
of State Farm but ultimately concluded that it had been correct when it
reinstated the jury‘s original $79.5 million punitive damages award.269
Again, the court rejected Philip Morris‘ argument that the jury should have
been instructed not to punish Philip Morris for the harm its misconduct
may have caused others.270 In light of the Supreme Court‘s State Farm
analysis, the court of appeals declared that Philip Morris‘ conduct was
highly reprehensible271 and that the facts justified an award exceeding a
single-digit ratio under the Due Process Clause.272 The court also noted
that Philip Morris‘ great wealth273 could be considered by the jury when
determining the amount of the punitive damages award.274 The court
ultimately concluded that ―an award of punitive damages in the amount of
$79.5 million does not violate the Due Process Clause under the guidelines
provided by State Farm because the amount of the award is reasonable and
proportionate to the wrong inflicted on decedent and the [citizens]‖ of the
state of Oregon.275
between smoking and disease, and if results were unfavorable they were destroyed; ―defendant‘s
actions caused harm to many others in Oregon besides Williams‖; and cigarettes are fairly
inexpensive to manufacture and therefore there is a high profit margin. Id. at 838–39.
263. Id. at 840. In Parrott, the Court affirmed a verdict with a ratio of 87:1 for punitive and
compensatory damages because the defendant‘s acts were ―particularly egregious.‖ Id. at 841.
264. Id. at 840–42.
265. Id. at 841–42.
266. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1182.
270. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). The court adhered
to its previous conclusion that, ―[T]he potential injury to past, present, and future consumers as the
result of a routine business practice is an appropriate consideration in determining the amount of
punitive damages.‖ Id. (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 837 (Or. Ct. App.
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Id. The court noted the ―defendant used fraudulent means to continue a highly profitable
business knowing that, as a result, it would cause death and injury to large numbers of Oregonians.‖
Id. at 143.
272. Id. at 145.
273. Id. The defendant‘s net worth was over $17 billion at the time. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 145–46.
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The Oregon Supreme Court then agreed to review the case, but limited
its review to two issues: whether the trial court‘s denial of Philip Morris‘
requested jury instruction was appropriate, and whether the $79.5 million
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.276
With respect to the jury instruction,277 the court agreed with the trial
court and court of appeals that the requested instruction ―was incorrect
under state law.‖278 Moreover, the court rejected Philip Morris‘ contention
that its proffered jury instruction was mandated by the holding in State
Farm, declaring instead that the instruction was actually inconsistent with
the reasoning in State Farm.279
With respect to whether the award was ―grossly excessive,‖ the court
applied the Gore guideposts, ultimately concluding that the award was not
―grossly excessive.‖280 When considering the reprehensibility of Philip
Morris‘ conduct,281 the court determined that when the facts were
construed in favor of Williams, Philip Morris‘ conduct was
―extraordinarily reprehensible‖ and thus supported a ―very significant‖
punitive damages award.282

276. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171–72 (Or. 2006). Philip Morris framed
the issues as follows:
A. Is a defendant entitled to have the jury instructed that any award of punitive
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the plaintiff
and that punitive damages cannot be imposed for alleged harm to non-parties?
B.
Are the punitive damages assessed in this case unconstitutionally excessive
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
Id. at 1171. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review on two other questions relating to (1)
detrimental reliance, and (2) federal preemption under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act. Id. at 1171–72.
277. See infra note 300 for the full text of the critical part of Philip Morris‘ proposed
instruction.
278. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1175.
279. Id. at 1176.
280. Id. at 1176–82.
281. Id. at 1177. The court considered whether:
―[T]he harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.‖
Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)).
282. Id. at 1177–78. The court found the behavior reprehensible because of the ―fraudulent
scheme‖ maintained by the defendant to ―deliberately . . . keep smokers smoking‖ while providing
them with ―false or misleading information‖ that the harmful effects of cigarettes were still
unknown. Id. at 1177.
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As to the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damage awards,
the court found that this guidepost, even when considering the potential
compensatory damages that Williams would have had if he had survived
longer, was ―not met.‖283 Finally, the court found that the comparable civil
or criminal sanctions284 ―support[ed] a very significant punitive damage
award.‖285 Thus, the Court concluded that ―[u]nder such extreme and
outrageous circumstances‖ the jury‘s $79.5 million punitive damages
award was consistent with due process.286
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
following issues as presented by Philip Morris: (1) its ―claim that Oregon
had unconstitutionally permitted it to be punished for harming nonparty
victims; and (2) whether Oregon had in effect disregarded ‗the
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to
the plaintiff‘s harm.‘‖287
B. Before the United States Supreme Court
Those who carefully follow the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages
jurisprudence would have expected Philip Morris to provide the Court
with a vehicle to clarify some of the uncertainty and ambiguity lingering in
the wake of State Farm.288 Court watchers were also anxious to see where
newly appointed Justices Roberts and Alito would come out on punitive
damages—would they join conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas in
refusing to engage in this type of substantive due process analysis, or
would they instead side with the more moderate (and pragmatically)
conservative Justice Kennedy?289 Paradoxically, the answer turned out to
283. Id. at 1181 (―All arguable versions of the ratios substantially exceed the single-digit ratio
(9:1) that the Court has said ordinarily will apply in the usual case.‖).
284. Id. at 1178–80. Here, the court considered only comparable criminal sanctions because no
comparable civil sanctions were cited by the parties or discovered through the court‘s own research.
Id. at 1179. However, the court expressly stated that it ―must exercise care‖ when relying on
criminal sanctions because of the United States Supreme Court‘s instructions in State Farm. Id. at
1179 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428).
285. Id. at 1179–80.
286. Id. at 1182.
287. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007).
288. See Carol J. Gatewood, Philip Morris Case Gives Justices a Chance to Exorcise
„Phantom‟ Plaintiffs, LAW.COM (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?
id=900005466263 (―The U.S. Supreme Court is presented today with the opportunity to untangle
the web of confusion concerning punitive damages.‖); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Will Hear Case
on High Punitive Damages, LAW.COM (May 31, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle
Friendly.jsp?id=900005549397 (―[L]ower state and federal courts have varied widely in their
interpretations of the State Farm decision . . . .‖); Anthony J. Sebok, The Upcoming Supreme Court
Argument Involving Punitive Damages Awards and Big Tobacco: Can These Awards Be Based on
Injury to Persons Other than the Plaintiff? Part Two in a Two Part Series, FINDLAW (Oct. 24,
2006), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/ sebok/20061024.html (stating as one of the issues left unresolved
by Gore and State Farm, ―Can punitive damages be used to punish a defendant for conduct that
harms anyone other than the plaintiff (or plaintiffs, if there is more than one)?‖).
289. See Joan Biskupic, $79.5M in Punitive Damages at Core of Supreme Court Case, USA
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be pretty much ―yes‖ to both questions—in joining Justice Breyer‘s
majority opinion (along with Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter) that
purported to resolve the case on procedural due process grounds,290
Justices Roberts and Alito were able to sidestep the substantive due
process issue completely.291
From all outward appearances, Philip Morris did not appear to be much
more than a stripped-down version of State Farm—a deep-pocketed
member of an unpopular industry seeking to overturn a very large punitive
damages award that followed a trial that exposed its misdeeds. Indeed,
many of the problems with the evidence in State Farm that could otherwise
distract from the core substantive due process issue, i.e., whether the
punitive damages award was ―grossly excessive,‖ were not present in
Philip Morris. For example, the trial court in Philip Morris did not admit
evidence of individuals in other states who were harmed by the defendant,
as had been done in State Farm.292 Moreover, the evidence admitted at trial
in Philip Morris did not concern other acts, whether similar or dissimilar,
committed by Philip Morris, as had been the case in State Farm.293
Accordingly, conventional wisdom suggested that the Supreme Court‘s
opinion would focus on the Gore guideposts, with particular attention paid
to the nearly 100:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.294
TODAY, Oct. 27, 2006, at 4A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
judicial/2006-10-26-damages_x.htm (quoting Mark Levy, a lawyer who closely monitors punitive
damages jurisprudence: ―‗The court is on the knife edge,‘ Levy says. If Roberts and Alito join the
justices who dissented in the State Farm case and want to leave the matter to the states, Levy says,
there would be ‗a sudden and radical change in this area of the law.‘‖); Greg Stohr, Roberts, Alito
Will Decide Punitive Damages Caps at High Court, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=a11NoJr8Oq2w&refer=politics (stating
that Roberts and Alito are the ―wild cards in the case‖ and must decide whether to side with the
conservatives, Scalia and Thomas, or the more centrist Justices: Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and
Stevens).
290. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353. In dissent, Justice Thomas rejected the Court‘s
characterization of the case as resting on procedural due process grounds: ―It matters not that the
Court styles today‘s holding as ‗procedural‘ because the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.‖
Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
291. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million in Punitive Damages Against
Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at A14 (explaining that the Court decided the case on
procedural rather than substantive grounds and wondering if the reason might be that Roberts and
Alito are unwilling to recognize substantive due process in punitive damages cases).
292. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420–21 (2003) (stating that
the trial court was convinced that there was no limit to the geographic scope of evidence that could
be admitted under Court precedent); Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 350 (explaining that the plaintiff‘s
attorney in Philip Morris had asked the jury to ―think about how many other Jesse Williams in the
last 40 years in the State of Oregon there have been‖) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
293. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 420–21.
294. See Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
361, 370 (―As it comes to the Supreme Court, Williams presents two basic issues: (1) the
relationship between the various Gore guideposts and (2) whether the Constitution permits a jury to
consider non-party conduct as it awards punitive damages.‖); Supreme Court to Hear Philip Morris
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But lurking just beneath the surface was the real issue driving this case—
the multiple punishments problem. As noted above,295 while Justice
Kennedy‘s majority opinion in State Farm purported to rely on principles
of federalism in deciding that a jury is not permitted to punish a defendant
for lawful, out-of-state conduct,296 he also characterized the potential for
multiple punishments as ―a more fundamental reason‖ for disallowing the
other acts evidence.297
1. The Briefs
a. Petition for Certiorari
Philip Morris sought review in the United States Supreme Court on the
basis of three questions presented:
1. Whether, in reviewing a jury‘s award of punitive
damages, an appellate court‘s conclusion that a defendant‘s
conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to a crime
can ―override‖ the constitutional requirement that punitive
damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff‘s harm.
2. Whether due process permits a jury to punish a defendant
for the effects of its conduct on non-parties.
3. Whether, in reviewing a punitive award for
excessiveness, an appellate court is permitted to give the
plaintiff the benefit of all conceivable inferences that might
support a finding of high reprehensibility even if the jury
made no such specific factual findings.298
In urging the Court to grant review on the first question presented,
Philip Morris chronicled what it argued were numerous splits and conflicts
among lower courts relating to the application of the second Gore
guidepost—the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.299
With respect to the second question presented, Philip Morris contended
that the Oregon Supreme Court‘s approval of the trial court‘s refusal to
Appeal, CNNMONEY.COM (May 30, 2006) http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/30/news/companies/
scotus_philipmorris/index.htm (―The high court set no . . . precise ratio between punitive and actual
damages for determining what would be ‗excessive‘ in violation of the Constitution‘s [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause. But exceptions could be made, said [Justice] Kennedy, ‗if a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.‘ That legal standard will
now be tested in this latest appeal.‖).
295. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
296. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
297. Id. at 422–23.
298. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346
(2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 849860, at *I.
299. See id. at 8–14.
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read an instruction informing the jury that it could not ―punish the
defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons‖300 was
both contrary to State Farm and created a conflict among the lower
courts.301 The problem with allowing a jury to punish a defendant for harm
caused to other persons was, of course, the multiple punishments problem:
―It is a recipe for multiple punishments for the same harms,‖302 that
―creates a grave risk of excessive, multiple punishment.‖303
The third question presented by Philip Morris concerned whether
courts reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness should automatically
draw all inferences in favor of upholding the verdict, as the Oregon
Supreme Court had done.304 While Philip Morris conceded that this
approach was perfectly appropriate in addressing the sufficiency of the
evidence questions,305 it argued that such an approach was not acceptable
in addressing excessiveness questions under the guidance of Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,306 which mandated a de
novo excessiveness review.307 The deferential approach adopted and
applied by the Oregon Supreme Court, argued Philip Morris, directly
contradicted the approach of the California Supreme Court308 and other
federal courts.309
300. Id. at 14. The full text of this part of Philip Morris‘ proposed jury instruction reads as
follows:
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm
caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant‘s punishable conduct. Although you
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that
reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in
which other juries can resolve their claims and award punitive damages for those
harms, as those other juries see fit.
Id. at 14–15.
301. Specifically, Philip Morris contended that both the California Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit had correctly applied State Farm, concluding that while harm to others could be
considered in the context of the reprehensibility Gore factor, the jury was not permitted to punish
the defendant for this harm. Id. at 19 (citing Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82, 93 (Cal.
2005) (allowing jury to consider ―[t]he scale and profitability of a course of wrongful conduct‖ in
evaluating reprehensibility but prohibiting jury from punishing the defendant for harm to anyone
other than the plaintiff); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004)
(―Punishing systematic abuses by a punitive damages award in a case brought by an individual
plaintiff . . . deprives the defendant of the safeguards against duplicative punishment that inhere in
the class action procedure.‖).
302. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 298, at 15.
303. Id. at 21.
304. Id. at 24.
305. See id.
306. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
307. See id. at 436–37.
308. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 298, at 24 (citing Simon v. San Paolo
U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005)).
309. See id. at 25.
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In opposition, Williams characterized the questions presented by Philip
Morris quite differently:
1. Whether the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages comprises the conclusive and overriding guidepost
as to the reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict.
2. Whether due process forbids a state from punishing a
defendant for its egregious and profitable misconduct on the
basis of the actual and potential effects of that misconduct
throughout the state.
3. Whether state law that requires appellate courts to review
facts in the light most favorable to the party for whom the jury
ruled violates due process of law.310
Williams devoted a majority of her opposition brief to the first
question, arguing that the Oregon Supreme Court ―faithfully‖ applied State
Farm, even though the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages far
exceeded the single-digit standard suggested by State Farm.311 With
respect to the second question, Williams contended that Philip Morris‘
proffered jury instruction was not mandated by State Farm, was contrary to
Oregon law, and was internally self-contradictory.312 Finally, with respect
to the third question, Williams argued that the Oregon Supreme Court‘s
deferential review was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and that
this argument had been waived by Philip Morris.313
The Supreme Court granted Philip Morris‘ petition but limited its
review to the first two questions presented.314
b. Briefs on the Merits
In its opening brief, Philip Morris recharacterized and reordered its
questions presented, choosing to lead with the question that directly raised
the multiple punishments problem:
1. Whether the Oregon courts deprived Philip Morris of due
process by permitting the jury to punish Philip Morris for
harms to non-parties.

310.
at *i.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Brief in Opposition at i, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 1151025,
Id. at 10–22.
Id. at 22–26.
Id. at 27–29.
See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352.
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2. Whether, in considering a claim that a punitive award is
unconstitutionally excessive, a court may disregard the
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be
reasonably related to the plaintiff‘s harm whenever it
concludes that (i) the jury could have found the defendant‘s
conduct to be highly reprehensible and (ii) the conduct could
come within the statutory definition of a crime.315
From the very beginning of its discussion of the first question
presented, Philip Morris attempted to focus the Court‘s attention on the
multiple punishments problem.316 Indeed, throughout its discussion of the
first question, Philip Morris repeatedly raised the specter of multiple
punishments for the same act or course of conduct, contending that the
Oregon Supreme Court‘s decision would allow juries to punish defendants
for harm to those not before the court.317 This multiple punishment, argued
Philip Morris, is ―plainly unconstitutional‖ in violation of due process.318
This is true, complained Philip Morris, because such punishment deprives
a defendant of property with no assurance that it will not be punished again
for the same conduct.319
With respect to the second question, Philip Morris argued that Supreme
Court precedent made clear that courts reviewing punitive damages awards
for excessiveness must pay careful attention to all three Gore guideposts.320
In light of the Oregon Supreme Court‘s admission that the second Gore
factor—the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages—was not
met, Philip Morris contended that the punitive damages award against it
violated due process and could not stand.321 Philip Morris then asserted
that when all three Gore factors were properly considered, a ratio no higher
than ―4:1‖ would be permissible.322

315. Brief for the Petitioner at I, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL
2190746, at *I.
316. Id. at 10 (―This Court has squarely held that ‗[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties‘ hypothetical claims
against a defendant.‘ That is because ‗[p]unishment on these bases creates the possibility of
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct . . . .‘‖ (citation omitted) (quoting State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003))).
317. Id. at 11 (―Oregon has embraced a procedure that affirmatively promotes excessive,
duplicative punishment: a defendant may be punished multiple times for the harms that it allegedly
imposed on hundreds or thousands of State residents, without regard to whether it could
successfully defend against the claims of some or most of those residents.‖); id. (―Therefore, other
Oregonians remain free to sue Philip Morris for smoking-related injuries, and to seek punitive
damages for their injuries, even though the punitive award in this case may already punish for those
harms. Insofar as any of those plaintiffs succeed, Philip Morris will be punished repeatedly for
causing exactly the same injuries to exactly the same people.‖).
318. Id. at 12.
319. Id. (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961)).
320. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 315, at 27–28.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 44.
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In opposition, Williams acceded to the change in the order of the
questions presented in Philip Morris‘ opening brief, and modified her
version of the questions presented from those articulated in her opposition
to certiorari:323
1. Whether due process allows a state to impose punitive
damages based on the actual and potential effects of the
defendant‘s wrongful conduct throughout the state?[324]
2. Whether the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages comprises the conclusive and overriding guidepost
as to the reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict?325
Williams did not, however, change the order of the arguments in her
brief, opting to lead with her argument that the level of reprehensibility of
Philip Morris‘ conduct justified the very large punitive damages award.326
Turning to the question of whether it was proper for Philip Morris to be
punished for causing harm to individuals other than the plaintiff, Williams
argued that because punitive damages are designed to punish the
defendant‘s conduct (rather than to compensate for plaintiff‘s harm), it was
entirely proper for the jury to consider harm caused to others by the
conduct in question when determining the appropriate size of a punitive
damages award.327 The Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence,
contended Williams, was not to the contrary.328 Williams addressed the
multiple punishments problem head on, declaring that it was ―little more
than a hypothetical possibility‖ under Oregon law and not an issue in this
case.329 This is true, contended Williams, because this case was the first
and only verdict in Oregon imposing punitive damages against Philip
Morris and because Oregon‘s statutory scheme required juries and
reviewing courts to take into account prior punitive damages awards for the
same misconduct.330 Finally, Williams contended that the jury instruction
proffered by Philip Morris was properly rejected by the trial court because,
as phrased, it was not correct under Oregon state law.331

323. Brief for Respondent at i, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2668158,
at *i.
324. Id. The wording of this question presented differs slightly from that used in Williams‘
opposition to certiorari. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
325. Id. The wording of this question presented is identical to that used in Williams‘
opposition to certiorari. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
326. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 4–20 (discussing the reprehensibility factor as it
applies to Philip Morris).
327. Id. at 35–44.
328. Id. at 37–38, 42–44.
329. Id. at 45.
330. Id. at 45–46.
331. Id. at 46–49.
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2. The Majority Opinion
Those who hoped the Court would provide additional clarification on
the ratio guidepost were sorely disappointed—the Court declined to reach
the Gore factors at all.332 Those who hoped the Court would repudiate (or
at least abandon) substantive due process in the punitive damages context
were also left empty-handed. Writing for a bare five-member majority,
Justice Breyer reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and
vacated the $79.5 million verdict.333 From the very beginning of the
opinion, Justice Breyer made clear that the Court‘s eye was on the multiple
punishments problem rather than on the Gore factors: ―The question we
address today concerns . . . whether the Constitution‘s Due Process Clause
permits a jury to base [a punitive damages] award in part upon its desire to
punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court.‖334
The ―persons who are not before the court‖ are, of course, others who have
been harmed by the defendant‘s same conduct who could later bring their
own claims for punitive (and compensatory) damages. As discussed below,
this opening statement in the opinion foreshadows later pronouncements
that make clear that the lurking and unresolved multiple punishments
problem heavily influences the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.335
After summarizing the material facts and the procedural history of the
case, Justice Breyer briefly traced the evolution of the Supreme Court‘s
incursion into punitive damages.336 In doing so, Justice Breyer drew a
careful distinction between substantive due process analysis and procedural
due process analysis: questions relating to whether a punitive damages
award is ―grossly excessive‖ are substantive due process questions while
(seemingly) all other questions are procedural due process questions.337
Since the Court resolved the case without deciding whether the punitive
damages award was ―grossly excessive,‖ reasoned Justice Breyer, then ipso
facto this was a procedural (and not substantive) due process case.338
Justice Breyer then declared that procedural due process ―forbids a
State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that
it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury
that it inflicts
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the
litigation.‖339 Justice Breyer went on to explain that this was true for at
least two reasons. First, punishing a defendant for harm to a nonparty
would deprive the defendant of an opportunity to present all available
332. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007).
333. Id. Joining Justice Breyer were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Alito. Id. at 348.
334. Id. at 349.
335. See infra notes 339–42 and accompanying text.
336. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352–53.
337. Id. at 353.
338. Id. Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas was less than convinced by what he perceived to be a
judicial sleight of hand: ―It matters not that the Court styles today‘s holding as ‗procedural‘ because
the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime
this Court has created for punitive damages.‖ Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
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defenses.340 Second, punishing a defendant for harm to a nonparty ―would
add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation,‖
leaving open such questions as the number
of victims and the
circumstances and seriousness of their injuries.341 But the more important,
yet here not explicitly stated, reason is what this author believes to be the
driving force behind the Court‘s prohibition of punishing the defendant for
harm to nonparties—the multiple punishments problem. As Justice
Kennedy (joined by, inter alia, Justice Breyer) noted in State Farm,
punishing a defendant for harm caused to nonparties ―creates the
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.‖342
Just why Justice Breyer chose not to mention explicitly343
the multiple
punishments problem here is discussed later in this Article.
Justice Breyer then clarified language from earlier opinions that had
suggested that punishing a defendant for harm to others was permissible.
First, he explained that while the Court had previously stated that it would
be permissible to consider ―the potential harm defendant‘s conduct could
have caused‖ when assessing punitive damages, only the potential harm to
the plaintiff was appropriately considered.344 Second, Justice Breyer
corrected a misimpression left by the Court‘s suggestion in Gore that the
Alabama Supreme Court‘s punitive damages calculation that likely
included a consideration of harm to nonparties was ―error-free.‖345
Justice Breyer then turned to the difficult task of distinguishing
between the proper use of evidence of harm to nonparties and the improper
and unconstitutional use of such evidence. Williams argued, and Philip
Morris conceded, that harm to nonparties caused by the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff was admissible and highly relevant to show the extent
of the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct.346 Justice Breyer readily
agreed: ―Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to
the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible . . . .‖347And while
it may consider such evidence when evaluating a defendant‘s
reprehensibility, ―a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is
alleged to have visited on nonparties.‖348 Accordingly, Justice Breyer
declared that procedural due process requires that juries be properly
instructed on the permissible uses of evidence of harm to nonparties.349
340. Id.
341. Id. at 354.
342. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (citing BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
343. See infra Part IV.
344. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 355.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. (―We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide
assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine
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Turning to the facts of the instant case, Justice Breyer agreed with
Philip Morris that the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the jury‘s punitive
damages award pursuant to a mistaken premise that it was permissible for
the jury to punish Philip Morris for the harm it caused to nonparties.350 The
Oregon Supreme Court, Justice Breyer determined, had failed to grasp the
difference between allowing a jury to consider harm to others when
evaluating reprehensibility on the one hand and actually punishing Philip
Morris for such harm on the other hand.351 That the Oregon Supreme Court
failed to appreciate this distinction was betrayed by its declaration that ―[i]f
a jury cannot punish for the conduct, then it is difficult to see why it may
consider it at all.‖352 As Justice Kennedy had done in State Farm,353 Justice
Breyer analogized to recidivism statutes that permit taking into account a
criminal defendant‘s other misconduct in determining the appropriate
punishment for the offense before the court.354
In an attempt to provide practical guidance to lower courts called upon
to apply this case, Justice Breyer explained that courts must take care not
to ―authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk
of any such confusion occurring.‖355 Consequently, when there is a
significant risk that the jury will misunderstand the distinction between
using evidence of harm to nonparties in evaluating the defendant‘s level of
reprehensibility and directly punishing the defendant for such harm, a court
must put in place procedures (presumably jury instructions) that protect
against such a risk, if requested by the defendant to do so.356 While
constitutionally mandated to take some precautions, states are afforded
some flexibility in determining what those precautions will look like.357
Concluding that the Oregon Supreme Court misunderstood and
misapplied the constitutional standard, the Court remanded the case to the
Oregon Supreme Court to apply the correct standard.358 In reliance upon
the fact that the Oregon Supreme Court might order a new trial or reduce
the size of the punitive damages on remand, the Court declined to reach the
question of whether the punitive damages award assessed by the jury
violated substantive due process as ―grossly excessive.‖359

reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused to strangers.‖).
350. Id. at 356–57.
351. Id. at 357.
352. Id. at 356 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165,
1175 n.3 (Or. 2006)).
353. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
354. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995)).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. (―Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of procedures they
will implement, federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in
appropriate cases.‖).
358. Id. at 357–58.
359. Id.
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3. The Dissents
The four Justices in dissent authored three opinions. Justices Stevens
and Thomas both dissented individually while Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent
was joined by both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
Having authored the majority opinion in Gore, and having joined
Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion in State Farm, Justice Stevens found
himself in unfamiliar territory as a dissenter, at least with respect to
punitive damages. Unlike Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, the
source of Justice Stevens‘s disagreement with the majority in Philip Morris
was not based on whether due process imposed substantive limits on
punitive damages awards or whether the Court was improvidently
intruding into territory reserved to the states. To the contrary, Justice
Stevens fully embraced the Court‘s prior punitive damages decisions.360
While agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the Oregon courts committed no
procedural errors, Justice Stevens was much more troubled by the
majority‘s 361
prohibition of punishing a defendant for causing harm to
nonparties. Justice Stevens‘s point of departure from the majority was in
the fundamental assumption of what punitive damages are designed to do.
While the majority viewed an award of punitive damages as vindication for
harm caused to the individual plaintiff, Justice Stevens, analogizing to the
justification for criminal sanctions, regarded the purpose of punitive
damages as vindication of harm caused to the public: ―Whereas
compensatory damages are measured by the harm the defendant caused the
plaintiff, punitive damages are a sanction for the
public harm the
defendant‘s conduct has caused or threatened.‖362 Justice Stevens
contended that the majority‘s approach marked a departure
from precedent,
complaining that ―[w]e have never held otherwise.‖363
Justice Stevens then took issue with the distinction the majority drew
between punishing a defendant for harm caused to nonparties on the one
hand, and considering such harm when evaluating the defendant‘s level of
reprehensibility on the other.364 Claiming that such a ―nuance‖ is a
distinction without a difference, Justice Stevens declared that ―[w]hen a
jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties
enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct, the jury is by
definition punishing the defendant—directly—for third-party harm.‖365
Justice Stevens also discounted the majority‘s analogy to recidivism
360. Id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I remain firmly convinced that the cases announcing
those constraints were correctly decided.‖).
361. Id. (―Unlike the Court, I see no reason why an interest in punishing a wrongdoer ‗for
harming persons who are not before the court‘ . . . should not be taken into consideration when
assessing the appropriate sanction for reprehensible conduct.‖).
362. Id. at 358–59; see also id. at 359 (―[A] punitive damages award, instead of serving a
compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence that
underlie every criminal sanction.‖).
363. Id. at 359. Justice Stevens did allow, however, that awarding ―compensatory damages to
remedy such third-party harm might well constitute a taking of property from the defendant without
due process.‖ Id.
364. Id. at 360.
365. Id.
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statutes, reasoning that if permitting past crimes that have already been
punished to serve as the basis for enhancing the punishment for the present
crime (as was allowed), then surely it was permissible to enhance the size
of a punitive damages award assessed for conduct that had never
previously been punished based upon the fact that such conduct injured
multiple people.366
Finally, Justice Stevens obliquely questioned the Court‘s
characterization of the case as one involving procedural, as opposed to
substantive, due process. While judicial restraint, cautioned Justice
Stevens, counseled the Court to exercise extreme care when announcing
new substantive due process rules, ―[t]oday the majority ignores that sound
advice.‖367
In his dissent, Justice Thomas saw little virtue in being oblique in his
attack on the majority opinion: ―It matters not that the Court styles today‘s
holding as ‗procedural‘ because the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has
created for punitive damages.‖368 And in Justice Thomas‘s view, the
substantive due process regime the Court has created for punitive damages
lacks constitutional legitimacy.369 As a parting shot, Justice Thomas
reiterated his prior characterization of the Court‘s punitive damages
jurisprudence as ―insusceptible of principled application.‖370
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg did not directly engage the majority on
its pronouncements regarding the contours of due process. Rather, she
disputed the majority‘s application of its due process rules to the actions of
the Oregon courts.
It is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg accepted the majority‘s new due
process rule to the effect that ―when punitive damages are at issue, a jury is
properly instructed to consider the extent of harm suffered by others as a
measure of reprehensibility, but not to mete out punishment for injuries in
fact sustained by nonparties,‖371 or simply supposed it to be accurate for
the purposes of argument. Convinced that ―[t]he Oregon courts did not rule
otherwise,‖372 however, Justice Ginsburg chided the Court for not
identifying any evidence or jury charge inconsistent with the due process
rule announced by the majority.373
366. Id. at 360 n.2. Importantly, Justice Stevens‘s rationale is based upon an assumption that
the conduct that gave rise to the punitive damages had not previously been punished. It thus appears
that if a punitive damages award had, in fact, already been imposed for the same conduct, then the
later award might violate due process as an impermissible multiple punishment.
367. Id. at 361.
368. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
369. Id. (―‗[T]he Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.‘‖
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429–30 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting))).
370. Id. at 361–62 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia,
J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)).
371. Id. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
372. Id.
373. Id. In support of this contention, Justice Ginsburg quoted the Oregon Supreme Court to

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2

48

Gash: The End Of An Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punit

2011]

THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD

573

The majority opinion, according to Justice Ginsburg, was ―all the more
inexplicable‖ given that Philip Morris did not object to (1) the evidence
introduced by Williams at trial, (2) the argument made by Williams‘
counsel, or (3) the actual instructions given to the jury.374 The only
objection Philip Morris raised was to the trial court‘s refusal to read the
jury instruction it offered—an instruction, contended Justice Ginsburg,
correctly refused by the trial court because it would have served to confuse,
rather than enlighten, the jury.375 Rather than addressing whether Philip
Morris‘ proposed instruction was proper, the majority, lamented Justice
Ginsburg, ―reaches outside the bounds of the case as postured when the
trial court entered its judgment.‖376 According to Justice Ginsburg, the net
result was that lower courts were now left to try to apply the Court‘s
―changing, less than crystalline precedent.‖377
C. Oregon Supreme Court Opinion on Remand
It appeared that Philip Morris had won a significant victory at the
United States Supreme Court even though the Court had side-stepped the
substantive due process ―gross excessiveness‖ discussion. The importance
of a ruling that defendants could not be directly punished through punitive
damages for harm caused to nonparties cannot be overstated; this was huge
for Philip Morris in this case and for all other defendants in future cases.378
One could not blame Philip Morris for having confidence that the directive
to lower courts that they must use sufficient procedural safeguards to
prevent this punishment would mean that the massive award against it
would likely be reduced dramatically. This was not meant to be.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that the mandate
of the Supreme Court was ―to apply the constitutional standard set by the
Supreme Court in our consideration of . . . whether the trial court erred in
refusing to give [Philip Morris‘] proposed jury instruction.‖379 But, before
it did so, the Oregon Supreme Court declared that it would first have to
consider ―a preliminary, independent state law standard.‖380 That
independent state law standard was ―a well-understood‖ Oregon rule to the
the effect that ―[t]he jury, in assessing the reprehensibility of Philip Morris‟s actions, could
consider evidence of similar harm to other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct.‖
Id. (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177 (Or. 2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
374. Id. at 362–63.
375. Id. at 363.
376. Id. at 364.
377. Id.
378. See Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Limits Punitive Damages, Backs Altria (Update 6),
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a.XIF
WwNpXJs (‗―This is a big win for the business community,‘ said Robin Conrad, senior vice
president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‘s litigation unit in Washington. ‗Today‘s decision
correctly addresses business‘s concern that punishing defendants for harm to those not involved in
the lawsuit denies a company the right to defend claims against it.‘‖).
379. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Or. 2008).
380. Id.
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effect that ―[a]n appellate court will not reverse a trial court‘s refusal to
give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed instruction was ‗clear
and correct in all respects, both in form and in substance.‘‖381 The court
then readily concluded that Philip Morris‘ proposed jury instruction was
incorrect in two ways. First, the proposed instruction used ―may‖ rather
than the statutorily prescribed ―shall‖ in relation to the jury‘s consideration
of Oregon‘s punitive damages factors.382 Second, the proposed
instruction‘s paraphrasing of one of the factors, concluded the court,
rendered it inaccurate under Oregon law, injecting an ―intent‖ element
where none existed.383 Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court declared
that although the trial court erred in rejecting Philip Morris‘ proposed
instruction on the grounds upon which the court relied, there were
additional, independent reasons grounded in Oregon law that rendered the
rejection of the instruction entirely appropriate.384 As a consequence, the
court reinstated the $79.5 million punitive damages award against Philip
Morris.385
D. Certiorari Dismissed as “Improvidently Granted”
Unsurprisingly, Philip Morris once again sought review in the United
States Supreme Court, raising the following two questions in its petition
for certiorari:
1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a
party‘s federal claim and remanded the case to state court
with instructions to ―apply‖ the correct constitutional
standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in
the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly
established nor regularly followed.
2. Whether a punitive damages award that is 97 times the
compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the
reprehensibility of a defendant‘s conduct can ―override‖ the
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be
reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm.386
Notably, the Court granted certiorari as to the first question only,387
declining once again to address the substantive due process ―gross
excessiveness‖ question.

381. Id. at 1261 (quoting Beglau v. Albertus, 536 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Or. 1975)).
382. Id. at 1262–63.
383. Id. at 1263.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1263–64.
386. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 553 U.S. 1093 (2008)
(No. 07-1216), 2008 WL 795148, at *i.
387. Philip Morris, 553 U.S. at 1093.
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At oral argument, counsel for Philip Morris stressed that the Oregon
Supreme Court never applied the standard mandated by the United States
Supreme Court, i.e., the need to prevent punitive damages from being
based on harm to nonparties.388 In response, counsel for Williams argued
that although the Oregon Supreme Court did not know prior to the Court‘s
decision that including harm to nonparties in a punitive damages calculus
violated the federal Constitution, it had to limit its review on remand to the
proposed jury instruction because it was the only issue preserved by Philip
Morris for appeal.389 And since the jury instruction was fatally flawed
under Oregon law, the Oregon Supreme Court correctly determined that
the award should stand.390
This discussion prompted a pointed question from Justice Souter to
counsel for Williams as to how the Court might prevent its constitutional
decisions being avoided on remand ―by some clever device.‖391 In the
ensuing dialogue, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that one way to
vindicate the Court‘s authority in this case would be to address the second
question raised by Philip Morris—the substantive due process question.392
But after raising the specter of reaching this question, the Chief Justice
made clear that he was not actually proposing a review of the substantive
due process question.393
Ultimately, after the oral arguments, the Court dismissed the writ of
certiorari as having been improvidently granted, and the case was finally
over.394
E. A Concurrent Grant of Certiorari: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
Before analyzing the current state of punitive damages jurisprudence in
the wake of Philip Morris, a brief discussion of Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker395 is necessary to fully set the stage. After the Oregon Supreme
Court‘s opinion on remand, but before the oral argument discussed
immediately above, another rather large punitive damages case, Exxon, was
brought before the Court. This case arose out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
in Alaska and involved a punitive damages award of $2.5 billion.396 Since
the spill took place in navigable waters, federal statutory and common law
applied to the case.397 Exxon sought certiorari on numerous grounds,
388. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Philip Morris, 553 U.S. 1093 (No. 07-1216), 2008 WL
6524409, at *3.
389. Id. at 47.
390. Id. at 47–48.
391. Id. at 48.
392. Id. at 51.
393. Id. at 52.
394. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436, 1436 (2009).
395. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
396. Id. at 2611.
397. Id. at 2626–27 (stating that the Court‘s review of punitive damages in the Exxon Valdez
oil spill involves ―regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this
Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of statute‖).
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including on the question of whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages
award was within the limits allowed by substantive due process.398
While the Court agreed to determine whether the punitive damages
award was excessive under federal maritime common law, it declined to
review whether the size of the award violated federal substantive due
process.399 The Court was able to skirt the constitutional ―excessiveness‖
issue because it decided a nearly identical question under federal maritime
law.400 Accordingly, this case is significant only to the extent it provides a
window into the views of the Justices who had previously abstained from
opining on the question of how big of a punitive damages award was too
big. This group of abstainers included not only Justices Thomas, Scalia,
and Ginsburg, who had previously steadfastly refused to engage in the
―gross excessiveness‖ inquiry,401 but it also included Chief Justice Roberts,
who had ducked this issue (with the rest of the majority in Philip Morris)
the one time it was presented to him after joining the Court. (Notably, it
did not include Justice Alito, even though he had avoided the ―gross
excessiveness‖ question in Philip Morris, because he recused himself from
this case on account of his ownership of Exxon stock.)402
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Exxon, which was
unanimous as to Parts I, II, & III, but three Justices—Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Stevens—dissented from Parts IV & V, which considered the size of
punitive damages under federal maritime law.403 In Parts IV & V, the Court
concluded that a 1:1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
was an appropriate limit.404 The analytical road to this firm numerical limit
began with the idea that a punitive damages award ―should be reasonably
predictable in its severity‖ to properly accomplish the deterrence
objective.405 Then, because a descriptive formulation of a standard was
susceptible to divergent interpretations, the Court concluded that a
quantified standard was preferable.406 After noting that placing numerical
caps on punitive awards was not well-suited for judge-made law because of
398. See id. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2007
WL 2383784, at *i.
399. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614 (―We granted certiorari to consider whether maritime law
allows corporate liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial agents,
whether the Clean Water Act forecloses the award of punitive damages in maritime spill cases, and
whether the punitive damages awarded against Exxon in this case were excessive as a matter of
maritime common law.‖ (internal citation omitted)).
400. Id. at 2626–27.
401. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
402. See Greg Stohr, Pfizer, Exxon Find U.S. Justices as Shareholders May Cost Them,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=aQhpG3
GxU2TQ&refer=home (―Alito‘s stock holdings in Exxon Mobil were in the $100,001 to $250,000
range, according to his 2006 disclosure form.‖).
403. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611, 2619–34.
404. Id. at 2633.
405. Id. at 2627.
406. See id. at 2628 (―Instructions can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when
awards are not tied to specifically proven items of damage . . . .‖).
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the changes wrought by inflation,407 Justice Souter and the four who joined
his opinion—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas—held that a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
was the best solution.408 To set the ratio, the Court consulted statistics
across a wide range of punitive damage awards that set the national median
ratio at less than 1:1.409 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a 1:1 ratio
―is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.‖410
Justice Stevens‘s dissent provided the lengthiest disagreement with the
majority.411 Although he acknowledged the Court‘s power to set a ratio,412
he argued that it was more prudent for Congress to take the lead in setting
mathematical ratios, quoting a prior case noting that ―maritime tort law is
now dominated by federal statute.‖413 While Justice Ginsburg agreed with
Justice Stevens that the Court had the power to set a ratio, and while she
thought that leaving it for Congress was a better choice, she acknowledged
that ―the question is close.‖414 Justice Ginsburg also noted the majority‘s
conclusion that runaway punitive damages awards were not a widespread
problem and argued that abuse of discretion review would presumably
suffice in dealing with outlier awards.415 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg added
that a firm 1:1 ratio, while appropriate in this case, may not be appropriate
in every future case.416 Finally, Justice Breyer found himself in unfamiliar
territory as a dissenter in a punitive damages case.417 Justice Breyer‘s
primary objection to the majority‘s opinion was its ―absolute fixed
numerical ratio.‖418 He cited the Court‘s prior punitive damages holdings
to note that the Court had left the door open in the past for limited
exceptions to its numerical ratios,419 and in this particular case, argued that
―a limited exception to the Court‘s 1:1 ratio is warranted.‖420
407. See id. at 2629 (noting also the problem ―that there is no ‗standard‘ tort or contract
injury‖).
408. See id.
409. See id. at 2633 (noting specifically that the appropriate number was around 0.65:1,
meaning that compensatory damages awards on average are approximately one-third higher than
punitive damage awards).
410. Id.
411. See id. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
412. See id. at 2638.
413. Id. at 2635 (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990)).
414. See id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
415. See id. (―The Court acknowledges that the traditional approach ‗has not mass-produced
runaway awards,‘ or endangered settlement negotiations. Nor has the Court asserted that outlier
awards, insufficiently checked by abuse-of-discretion review, occur more often or are more
problematic in maritime cases than in other areas governed by federal law.‖ (citation omitted)).
416. See id. (―In the end, is the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law ceiling, or is it
also signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to exceed ‗the constitutional outer limit‘?
On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due process requires in
all of the States, and for all federal claims?‖ (citation omitted)).
417. See id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
418. Id.
419. Id. (―In setting forth constitutional due process limits on the size of punitive damages
awards, for example, we said that ‗few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
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IV. DECONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING: WHAT IS THE STATE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND
WHERE WILL THE COURT GO NEXT?
In the wake of Philip Morris, one could not be blamed for wondering
whether the dissenting Justices are correct that the Court‘s ―changing, less
than crystalline precedent‖421 is ―insusceptible of principled
application.‖422 Several other questions come to mind. Does the Court‘s
decision to dispose of Philip Morris on procedural, rather than substantive,
due process signal a shift in the Court‘s approach to reviewing punitive
damages cases? What, if anything, do Philip Morris and Exxon tell us
about the punitive damages jurisprudence of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito? Does the Court‘s new due process rule that prohibits a
defendant from being punished for harm caused to nonparties make any
progress toward resolving the multiple punishments problem? What does
the Court‘s decision to avoid the substantive due process question raised
by Philip Morris on its final petition for certiorari, as well as its ultimate
dismissal of the remaining question raised as improvidently granted, say
about the future of punitive damages jurisprudence before the Court?
Likewise, what, if anything, does the Court‘s refusal to consider the due
process ramifications of the $2.5 billion punitive damages award in Exxon
tell us about the future of the Court‘s involvement in punitive damages
cases? Finally, how will the addition of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
influence this future? These and other questions are addressed below.
A. Procedural v. Substantive Due Process
As discussed above, Haslip was the Court‘s first due process case in
the punitive damages realm.423 Because the issue in Haslip was how the
jury was instructed, the Court analyzed the case on procedural due process
grounds.424 In contrast, in TXO, the issue was whether the punitive
damages award itself was ―grossly excessive,‖ i.e., whether the award was
too big.425 Accordingly, TXO was analyzed under substantive due process
grounds. Therefore, one can divine a dividing line between when
procedural due process governs and when substantive due process
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.‘‖ (emphasis added)
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).
420. Id. (arguing he could ―find no reasoned basis to disagree with the Court of Appeals‘
conclusion that this is a special case, justifying an exception from strict application of the majority‘s
numerical rule‖).
421. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
423. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
424. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–24 (1991).
425. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
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governs: questions relating to how the jury does its work, including how
the jury is instructed and what evidence it is allowed to consider, implicate
procedural due process, whereas questions relating to how big the award is
(i.e., whether the award was grossly excessive) implicate substantive due
process. Using this dividing line, then, both Gore and State Farm might
superficially seem to be quintessential substantive due process cases
because the opinions seemed to revolve around the three-pronged ―gross
excessiveness‖ inquiry. And since Philip Morris seemed to involve little
more than an extension and clarification of the analysis in both of those
previous cases, it too might facially seem to be a substantive due process
case, rendering Justice Breyer‘s pronouncements to the contrary426 to be
disingenuous. A more nuanced look at Gore and State Farm, however,
reveals that, while embedded in a substantive due process framework, the
pivotal analysis in both of those cases actually concerned procedural, and
not substantive, matters. In fact, a strong case can be made for the
contention that both Gore and State Farm could have (and should have)
been resolved solely on procedural due process grounds as the Court
purported to do in Philip Morris.427
As previously discussed, Justice Breyer was careful both at the
beginning of the majority opinion428 and at the end429 to make clear that the
Court‘s decision revolved around procedural, rather than substantive, due
process. In dissent, both Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens were critical
of this characterization, arguing that the majority opinion was more
properly characterized as a substantive due process case.430 Justice
Thomas‘s criticism was open, direct, and consistent with his prior
criticisms of the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence431 and merits no
further discussion. On the other hand, Justice Stevens‘s criticism is more
tempered and seems to argue a bit too vigorously a point not openly in
dispute—that the Court‘s prior substantive due process punitive damages
cases are still valid law in the wake of Philip Morris.432 So why the dispute
about whether procedural or substantive due process is driving the
decision? Who is right? Does it matter?
In the view of this author, there are three plausible explanations for
how the Philip Morris case played out (at least prior to its decision to
vacate certiorari on the final appeal as improvidently granted) and why it
played out that way. The first is that the status quo was preserved, while
426. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007).
427. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
428. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353 (―Because we shall not decide whether the award here
at issue is ‗grossly excessive,‘ we need now only consider the Constitution‘s procedural
limitations.‖).
429. See id. at 358 (―Because the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new
trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider whether the
award is constitutionally ‗grossly excessive.‘‖).
430. See supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 368–70 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
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the second and third signal a contraction in the scope of the Court‘s view
of its role in punitive damages jurisprudence in the years to come.
The first explanation is that, notwithstanding the criticisms leveled by
Justices Stevens and Thomas, the Court‘s decision was in fact based solely
on procedural due process, and the Court‘s decision to avoid substantive
due process was based upon legitimate prudential considerations.433 The
second is that Justices Roberts and Alito are flatly unwilling to recognize a
substantive due process limitation on the size of punitive damages awards,
placing them squarely in the camp with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg.434 And the third is that while Justices Roberts and Alito are
willing to go along with the recognition of such a substantive due process
limitation, they are unwilling to expand that limitation beyond the scope of
the prior cases.435 Each of these possible interpretations of the Court‘s due
process characterization is discussed below.
1. Substantive Due Process Was Simply Not Implicated and Is
Alive and Well
The first possible interpretation of Philip Morris is that we should take
the case at face value and assume that nothing whatsoever has changed
about the Court‘s approach to substantive due process. This approach to
Philip Morris would argue that the Court‘s failure to overrule (or even
criticize) Gore and State Farm should be interpreted to mean that those
cases are not only still good law, but that the Court will continue to be
vigilant about assuring that juries do not issue (and courts do not affirm)
grossly excessive punitive damages awards. Because Justice Stevens
remained firmly committed to substantive due process in this context,436
and because Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Souter were also firmly on
board with this concept,437 all it would have taken was for either Chief
Justice Roberts or Justice Alito to join this foursome, and there would have
been the necessary five votes to continue the Court‘s jurisprudential
approach to punitive damages. And because both Justices joined the
majority in Philip Morris, which neither overruled nor questioned Gore or
State Farm, one might be tempted to assume that the status quo was
preserved. This reading gives credence to Justice Breyer‘s contention in
Philip Morris that the Court declines to reach the substantive due process
issue solely for prudential reasons.438 But based upon how the case played
out after it was remanded, this simply cannot be the case.
As previously discussed, on remand, the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed the $79.5 million punitive damages award on the ground that
procedural due process was not denied to Philip Morris when its proposed
433. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
434. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
435. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
436. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
437. All three Justices had been in the majority in both Gore and State Farm. See supra note
103 and accompanying text; supra note 169 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
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jury instruction was rejected.439 It is important to remember that certiorari
was initially granted in Philip Morris on both procedural and substantive
due process grounds.440 Given the majority‘s express declaration that it
need not reach the substantive due process question because the award
needed to be vacated on procedural due process grounds,441 this squarely
placed before the Court the substantive due process issue. But the Court
blinked—twice. First, the Court blinked when it declined to re-grant
certiorari on substantive due process following the affirmance by the
Oregon Supreme Court.442 Second, the Court blinked when, during oral
argument, Chief Justice Roberts raised the possibility of subjecting the
award to substantive due process scrutiny and then quickly backed away.443
Given that the punitive damages award in this case was nearly 100
times greater than the compensatory damages award, and given State
Farm‘s admonition that only single-digit multipliers would likely comply
with substantive due process, it strains credulity to believe that Philip
Morris simply maintains the status quo. A simple application of the Gore
guideposts would surely have led to the award in Philip Morris being
struck down.
2. Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Is Dead
Though not immediately apparent from Philip Morris, it may be that
the best explanation of the majority‘s decision to characterize the due
process problem with the case as procedural rather than substantive is that
there were no longer five Justices willing to continue to recognize
substantive due process limitations in the punitive damages context.
Prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court, both Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito were universally regarded as judicial
conservatives.444 Among the other seven Justices then on the bench, it is
uncontroversial to say that Justices Scalia and Thomas are widely
considered the two most conservative members of the Court and are also
commonly characterized as judicial conservatives. As discussed
previously, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas adamantly oppose the
Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence,445 while
both have previously joined opinions recognizing and applying procedural
due process constraints in punitive damages cases.446 (Justice Ginsburg
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

See supra Part III.C.
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 392–93 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Roberts Would Swing the Supreme Court to the Right,
BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=alGK4
Jy5eXwc; Bill Mears, Alito‟s Record Shows Conservative Judge, CNNPOLITICS.COM (Oct. 31,
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-10-31/politics/alito.record_1_abortion-laws-chief-justice-johnroberts-judicial-philosophy?_s=PM:POLITICS.
445. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
446. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994) (invalidating a
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also dissented in both Gore and State Farm and has been sharply critical of
the Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence.)447
Accordingly, one might reasonably expect that with the addition of Justices
Roberts and Alito, five members of the Court would be ready to scuttle the
Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence in its
entirety, which would, of course, mean overruling Gore and (at least to
some degree) State Farm.448 Indeed, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito are uncomfortable with substantive due process in the punitive
damages context is perhaps the best explanation of why and how the case
unfolded the way it did, and why the majority opinion in Philip Morris,
which included both Justices Roberts and Alito in its bare five-Justice
majority, discussed only procedural due process, avoiding venturing into
substantive due process territory. An important lens through which to
examine the majority opinion is the dissent of Justice Stevens.
Justice Stevens begins his dissent with a straightforward and seemingly
uncontroversial statement to the effect that the Due Process Clause
imposes both procedural and substantive limitations on states‘ power to
impose punitive damages, citing each of the Court‘s punitive damages
cases over the past fifteen years.449 Curiously, Justice Stevens then declares
with unnecessary vigor, ―I remain firmly convinced that the cases
announcing those constraints were correctly decided,‖450 as if he were
responding to a statement in the majority opinion calling those cases into
question. One searches in vain in the text or footnotes of that opinion for
any such statement.451 Later, in the penultimate paragraph of his dissent,
Justice Stevens again tilts at the proverbial windmill, declaring ―[i]t is far
too late in the day to argue that the Due Process Clause merely guarantees
fair procedure and imposes no substantive limits on a State‘s lawmaking
power.‖452 It is far too late for whom to be arguing this? The majority
opinion did not make such a claim; it simply (and expressly) did not reach
this question because it resolved the case on procedural due process
grounds.453 Not even Williams argued that due process did not contain a
substantive element that constrained the size of punitive damages awards.
The only ones making this claim are the three other dissenting Justices—
Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas—and it seems rather unlikely that
Justice Stevens would be directing this point at his fellow dissenters.
punitive damages award on procedural due process grounds).
447. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607–14 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430–39 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Honda, 512 U.S. at 436–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
448. I say ―to some degree‖ because, as discussed above, State Farm easily could have been
decided solely on procedural due process grounds. See supra notes 172–95 and accompanying text.
449. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358–59 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 358.
451. Indeed, why would there be? The opinion was written by Justice Breyer, who was in the
majority in both Gore and State Farm. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
452. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 360–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
453. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
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So to whom is he addressing his comments? Because Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, and Souter have consistently sided with the majority in the
Court‘s previous punitive damages cases (recognizing substantive due
process in the punitive damages context), the most logical conclusion is
that this was directed at the two new Justices—Roberts and Alito, who had
joined the Court since State Farm.
While we have no way of knowing this (and we may never know), it is
possible (perhaps even likely) that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
made clear to the other Justices that they believed the Court‘s substantive
due process decisions in the punitive damages realm were incorrectly
decided and that they would side with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg if forced to decide the case on substantive due process grounds.
Both the majority opinion and Justice Stevens‘ dissent are consistent with
this hypothesis. The majority is consistent in that it grounds the case in
procedural due process and declines to venture into substantive due
process, and Justice Stevens‘s dissent is consistent because it raises a
somewhat spirited defense of substantive due process even though it has
not been openly attacked.
Further buttressing this hypothesis (at least to some degree) is the
Court‘s decision, within months of deciding Philip Morris, to exclude from
its review of the staggering $2.5 billion punitive damages award in Exxon
the defendant‘s challenge that such an award was grossly excessive in
violation of substantive due process.454 Even more support is found in the
fact that the Court denied certiorari in Philip Morris after the affirmance on
remand by the Oregon Supreme Court on the very same substantive due
process question on which it had previously granted review.455
Cutting against this hypothesis, however, is the fact that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to the majority opinion in Philip
Morris even though it suggested the Court‘s approval of prior substantive
due process cases: ―For these and similar reasons, this Court has found that
the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for
awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as ‗grossly
excessive.‘‖456 This facial support for substantive due process, however,
seems tepid and carefully worded such that there is room to argue that this
was simply an acknowledgement, rather than a reaffirmance, of the prior
precedents. The unnatural wording of the very next sentence in the opinion
further fuels such speculation: ―Because we shall not decide whether the
award here at issue is ‗grossly excessive,‘ we need now only consider the
Constitution‘s procedural limitations.‖457 Why ―shall not decide‖? If
substantive due process were alive and well, Justice Breyer seemingly
should have reversed the order of the sentence to say instead: ―Because we
find the punitive damages award to violate procedural due process, we
need not decide whether the award here at issue is ‗grossly excessive.‖‘
454.
455.
456.
457.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 398, at *i.
See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353 (citing, inter alia, State Farm and Gore).
Id.
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Perhaps cutting once again the other way, but only slightly, is the more
natural wording in the final paragraph of the majority opinion: ―Because
the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new trial, or a
change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider
whether the award is constitutionally ‗grossly excessive.‘‖458 Again, why
―shall not‖ rather than ―need not‖?
It is no answer to argue that if either or both Chief Justice Roberts or
Justice Alito had agreed with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg that a
substantive due process review of punitive damages awards was improper,
all they had to do was join their dissents in Philip Morris. It is important to
remember that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito disagreed with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg on the procedural due process
point, and thus, it would have been exceedingly awkward for them to join
the majority opinion while at the same time pledging allegiance to a
viewpoint expressed in dissent.
In summary, while it is not possible to ascertain from Philip Morris
with any certainty whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito consider
substantive due process illegitimate in the punitive damages realm, there is
ample reason to believe that they are not eager to wield its power more
than is absolutely necessary, which suggests that the third alternative of
Philip Morris is likely the correct one.
3. The Court Has Said All It Cares to Say About Substantive Due
Process
The third possible explanation of the majority‘s opinion is that, while
Justices Roberts and Alito are not fond of the Court‘s substantive due
process jurisprudence, they (1) are unwilling to overrule the Court‘s
substantive due process cases, and (2) do not intend to revisit this line of
cases.
As discussed in the immediately prior section, there are good reasons to
believe that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are not entirely
comfortable with the Court‘s substantive due process jurisprudence in the
punitive damages realm.459 Yet had they affirmatively wanted to overrule
this line of cases, either Philip Morris or Exxon would have provided a
perfect vehicle for accomplishing that task. Both involved large punitive
damages awards against unpopular defendants (tobacco and oil), and the
defendants in both cases sought to have the awards overturned as ―grossly
excessive‖ in violation of substantive due process. Yet, the Justices let the
opportunity go. Again, it can certainly be argued that they initially
sidestepped this issue on prudential grounds.460 But there is no
immediately obvious reason why cases such as Philip Morris should be
resolved on procedural due process grounds, if possible, so as to avoid
deciding them on substantive due process grounds. Both grounds are
458. Id. at 358.
459. See supra notes 454–58 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally based, and no case law seems to exist instructing courts to
avoid substantive due process when procedural due process will suffice.
It would have been equally defensible for the Court to avoid the
procedural due process grounds by deciding the case solely on substantive
due process grounds. Indeed, a straightforward application of the Gore
factors very well could have led to the award being overturned because the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (roughly 100:1)461 was way too
high. Such an approach would have obviated the need to create a new
constitutional rule, which is precisely what Justice Stevens scolded the
majority for doing.462
Accordingly, perhaps the most natural interpretation of Philip Morris
(and the Court‘s refusal to review Exxon on substantive due process
grounds) is that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are neither inclined
to overrule the substantive due process punitive damages cases nor to
expand their reach. In fact, it seems fair to say that the Court, given its
current makeup,463 will no longer take punitive damages cases even if they
do not comply with the Gore guideposts.
This conclusion that the Supreme Court is done with substantive due
process in the punitive damages realm is supported by at least three points.
First, as discussed below, the Court appears to have completed its creation
of a punitive damages structure that it believes sufficiently avoids the
multiple punishments problem.464 If a defendant can be punished only for
the harm caused to the plaintiff, or so the argument goes, then there is no
longer a risk of multiple punishments for the same conduct. But as also
discussed below, this guarantee is illusory, and its premise ignores
centuries of punitive damages jurisprudence.465 Nevertheless, since the
Supreme Court‘s recent involvement in punitive damages has been driven
by its concern with the multiple punishments problem,466 there is good
reason to believe that the Court will no longer inject itself into this area.
Second, if the Court were at all inclined to continue evaluating punitive
damages on substantive due process grounds, why did it excise that issue
from Exxon at the point it granted certiorari? After all, if the case turned
out to be resolvable on other grounds, the Court could have simply
declined to reach the substantive due process claim as it did in Philip
Morris. If, on the other hand, the case had not turned out to be resolvable
on other grounds, the Court had prevented itself from invalidating the
award on substantive due process grounds. Accordingly, by refusing to
allow the parties even to brief this issue, the Court seems to have been
461. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351.
462. See id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As discussed below, the multiple punishments
problem was likely an additional driving force in the Court‘s decision to avoid substantive due
process.
463. At the time of this writing, the Court consists of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
464. See infra Part IV.B.
465. See infra Part IV.B.
466. See supra notes 189, 339–43 and accompanying text.
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signaling that it had said all it was going to say on substantive due process
in the punitive damages realm.467
Third, if the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito did not
cause a change in the Court‘s approach, it almost certainly would have
reached the merits of the substantive due process claim even though the
case was resolvable on procedural due process grounds—just as it had
done in both Gore and State Farm.
In Gore, which is widely regarded as a substantive due process case,468
the Court explained that punitive damages awards ―must be supported by
the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own
economy.‖469 Because the jury in Gore was permitted, indeed
encouraged,470 to punish BMW for lawful out-of-state conduct,471 the
Court declared that federalism principles did not permit punishment
through punitive damages of ―conduct that is lawful in other
jurisdictions.‖472 Because this relates to how the jury reached its punitive
damages award, rather than how big that award was, this was a procedural
due process shortcoming and easily could have served as an independent
and adequate basis for invalidating the award and remanding it back to the
state from which it came (without ever reaching the substantive due
process issue), as was done in Philip Morris. But that did not happen.
Instead, the Court proceeded to the next question of whether the
punitive damages award, even after it was remitted by the Alabama
Supreme Court, was ―grossly excessive‖ in violation of substantive due
process.473 As discussed previously, it was at this point that the Court
467. Another important aspect of Exxon that made it even less attractive to the Court is that the
multiple punishments problem was not, and could not have been, implicated. This is true because in
Exxon, a class action for punitive damages was certified, see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008), making it impossible for Exxon to be subject to multiple punitive damages
awards for the act or course of conduct that gave rise to that case.
468. See, e.g., Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 443 (Kan. 2006)
(―Since 1996, in Gore and Campbell, the Supreme Court has addressed excessive punitive damages
as a matter of substantive due process.‖); Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO
L. REV. 1501, 1509 (1999) (stating that Gore ―was very much a substantive due process decision‖);
Redish & Mathews, supra note 70, at 9 (―[A]s framed in Gore, the Court‘s inquiry is entirely one of
economic substantive due process . . . .‖); Stekloff, supra note 125, at 1797 (―In BMW v. Gore, the
United States Supreme Court struck down a punitive damages award because it was ‗grossly
excessive‘ and therefore an arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖).
469. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).
470. Id. at 564 (―Dr. Gore introduced evidence that since 1983 BMW had sold 983 refinished
cars as new, including 14 in Alabama . . . . Using the actual damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle,
Dr. Gore argued that a punitive award of $4 million would provide an appropriate penalty for
selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were worth.‖).
471. Id. at 572–73.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 574–75. It may be plausible to argue that the reason the Court did stop in its
analysis after finding what amounts to a procedural due process violation, instead of proceeding to
the substantive due process analysis, is that the Alabama Supreme Court, recognizing the
procedural due process violation, reduced the punitive damages award, taking into account only
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created the guidepost framework designed to measure whether an award is
―grossly excessive‖ in violation of substantive due process.474
Following closely on Gore‘s analytical heels, State Farm, another case
that is widely viewed as a substantive due process case,475 took the judicial
baton and expanded upon Gore‘s procedural due process reasoning. While
Gore had made clear that lawful out-of-state conduct could not be punished
through punitive damages,476 it did not answer the question of whether
unlawful out-of-state conduct could be similarly punished.477 (Once again,
this relates to how the jury reached its punitive damages award—a
procedural due process matter.) Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in State Farm
initially skirted this open question by pointing out that the plaintiffs in
State Farm conceded that much of the out-of-state conduct introduced into
evidence at the trial ―was lawful where it occurred.‖478 Then, relying on
―basic principle[s] of federalism,‖ Justice Kennedy effectively closed the
door on the prospect of punishment for even unlawful out-of-state conduct:
―[E]ach State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant
who acts within its jurisdiction.‖479 But Justice Kennedy did not stop there.
He then relied upon ―a more fundamental reason‖ (than even federalism)—
due process.480 In explaining the due process concerns, Justice Kennedy
declared that ―[a] defendant‘s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive
damages.‖481 This declaration does two things that are important here.
First, it essentially moots the federalism question by taking the location of
the prior conduct out of the equation entirely—if the conduct is dissimilar,
it matters not where it occurred because dissimilar conduct as a class
cannot serve as the basis for punitive damages. Second, it begs the question
of whether similar conduct may serve as the basis for punitive damages.
Because the Court found that the plaintiffs had ―shown no conduct by State
Farm similar to that which harmed them,‖482 Justice Kennedy had no
occasion to answer this question directly. He did, however, provide a clear
harm to Alabama citizens. Had the Court not been intent on announcing a new substantive due
process guidepost framework, however, the Court still could have remanded the case back to the
Alabama Supreme Court with instructions for it to order a new trial without the evidence of out-ofstate harm.
474. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
475. See, e.g., Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 443 (2006) (―Since
1996, in Gore and Campbell, the Supreme Court has addressed excessive punitive damages as a
matter of substantive due process.‖); Redish & Mathews, supra note 70, at 11 (claiming that State
Farm ―added another chapter to the substantive due process story of punitive damages‖).
476. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).
477. See Gash, supra note 9, at 1639.
478. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
479. Id. at 422.
480. Id. at 422–23.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 424.
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signal as to how this question would be answered—a signal that Justice
Breyer received loudly and clearly as he was writing the majority opinion
in Philip Morris.
This signal came in the form of two critical sentences that would form
the basis for the Philip Morris decision. These two sentences read as
follows:
Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties‘
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah
Supreme Court did that here. . . . Punishment on these bases
creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards
for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not
bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.483
While Justice Kennedy did not explicitly identify whether the ―due
process‖ to which he refers is procedural or substantive, it is indisputable
that he is referring to procedural due process because he is talking about
how the jury reached its decision on the punitive damages award (i.e., what
evidence the jury was allowed to consider), rather than how big the award
was.
Importantly, however, unlike in Philip Morris, the Court did not
separate out this procedural due process analysis from the substantive due
process analysis. Instead, this discussion was embedded within an analysis
of the reprehensibility guidepost of the substantive due process ―gross
excessiveness‖ inquiry.484
In summary, the Court in both Gore and State Farm ultimately
analyzed whether the size of the punitive damages award was ―grossly
excessive.‖485 Once again, this is the quintessential substantive due process
question, i.e., how big?486 But in both cases, the Court addressed the
substantive due process question after determining that a procedural due
process error had been committed, i.e., finding that the evidence and
instructions given to the respective juries were inappropriate.487 In neither
case, however, did the Court explicitly announce that its evaluation of the
evidence and instructions given to the jury was a procedural (rather than
substantive) due process issue. Nor was there any attempt to disaggregate
the procedural due process analysis from the substantive due process
analysis.
Reframing the issue then, all three cases (Gore, State Farm, and Philip
Morris) involved allegations of both procedural due process violations
(how the jury reached its decision, i.e., what evidence it was allowed to
consider and what instructions it was given), and substantive due process
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

Id. at 423.
See id. at 422–24.
See supra Parts I.C.2–3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 424–25 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.C.2–3 and accompanying text.
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violations (how big the punitive damages award was, i.e., whether the
award was ―grossly excessive‖). In both Gore and State Farm, the Court
found violations of both procedural and substantive due process and
explicitly addressed both aspects. In contrast, the Court in Philip Morris
departed from its custom of analyzing both procedural and substantive due
process and decided to stop its analysis after determining there was a
procedural due process violation. Indeed, unlike in both Gore and State
Farm, the Court in Philip Morris segregated its procedural due process
analysis from (rather than embedding such analysis within) its substantive
due process analysis so that it would be unnecessary to reach the latter
question.
This stark shift in approach can best (perhaps only) be explained by the
change in the makeup of the Court, and signals that the Court, while not
willing to abandon substantive due process altogether, has said all that it
intends to say about substantive due process. This view is once again
bolstered by the fact that it (1) declined to consider the substantive due
process challenge in Exxon; and (2) declined to consider Philip Morris‘
substantive due process challenge even after the $79.5 million award was
affirmed by the Oregon Supreme Court.
An even more compelling reason to believe that the Court has entered a
prolonged silent phase in its substantive due process jurisprudence is that
the Court appears to believe that it has solved the multiple punishments
problem, at least to the best of its limited ability.
B. Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem
As previously discussed, the multiple punishments problem has been
the unresolved issue driving the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages
jurisprudence all along.488 It was alluded to in Gore when, under the
substantive due process banner, the Court said that a defendant could not
be punished for lawful out-of-state conduct but then left open the question
of whether the out-of-state conduct had to be unlawful.489 This limitation
had the effect of reducing the total number of nonparties harmed by the
defendant‘s conduct for which the defendant could be punished consistent
with due process. In other words, by eliminating those nonparties located
out of state who were harmed by defendant‘s lawful conduct, the scope of
the multiple punishments problem was reduced.
The multiple punishments problem was further addressed in State
Farm when, once again on substantive due process grounds, the Court
clarified that a defendant could not be punished for out-of-state conduct
even if it was unlawful.490 This limitation also had the effect of
diminishing the scope of the multiple punishments problem by further
reducing the number of nonparties harmed by the defendant‘s conduct for
which the defendant could be punished—no longer could a defendant be
488. See generally Gash, supra note 9, at 1631–34.
489. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
490. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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punished for harm to out-of-state nonparties regardless of whether or not
the defendant‘s conduct was legal. But the Court in State Farm was not
done chipping away at the multiple punishments problem. The Court then
added that the other acts that harmed nonparties could not be used to
punish the defendant if those acts were dissimilar to the conduct at issue in
the case before the court. Once again, this limitation further reduced the
scope of the multiple punishments problem. In essence, then, a defendant
could not be punished for harm caused to nonparties if the nonparties were
out of state or (even if they were in state) if they had been injured by
dissimilar conduct by the defendant. This prohibition on punishment for
dissimilar conduct, of course, left open the question as to whether the other
conduct could be punished at all, even if it was similar.491
This set the stage for one final assault on the multiple punishments
problem in Philip Morris. In that case, the Court declared that other acts
that harmed nonparties, whether similar or dissimilar, could not be
punished at all.492 Again, this further reduced the universe of harmed
nonparties for which the defendant could be punished in the case before the
court. Now, even harm to in-state nonparties caused by similar conduct
could not, consistent with due process, be punished.
The final swipe at the multiple punishments problem in Philip Morris
was even more far reaching—due process did not even permit the
defendant to be punished for harm to nonparties caused by the very same
conduct that injured the plaintiff. Accordingly, when all was said and done,
the Court had not only reduced the scope of the conduct for which the
defendant could be punished to only the conduct at issue in the case, but it
also reduced the universe of individuals whom the defendant could be
punished for harming to only the party bringing the action. Needless to say,
over the course of three cases, the Court dealt a substantial blow to the
multiple punishments problem.
While the Court‘s solution may serve to reduce the multiple
punishments problems, this solution is far from perfect. First, the Court‘s
solution rests on the illusion that juries will be able to follow its proposed
limiting instructions. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Philip Morris, stated
that the distinction the Court draws between considering harm to
nonparties in the reprehensibility analysis and not considering it when
computing damages to directly punish the defendant is a ―nuance [that]
eludes me.‖493 Practically speaking, if the nuance eludes a Supreme Court
Justice, it can be expected to elude the vast majority of jurors as well. This
is not a minor point. Before the Court can rest easy knowing its conceptual
understanding of how to solve the multiple punishments problem is being
implemented, it must necessarily develop a framework ―so that courts can

491. See supra notes 185–93 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 344–57 and accompanying text.
493. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 360 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reach consistent and predictable results.‖494 Accordingly, while the Court‘s
final word in Philip Morris purports to be a solution, it is not a good one.
Second, limiting the scope to the recovery of private wrongs runs
counter to other competing theories of punitive damages. As a result, there
may be other state interests in allowing punitive damages that the Court‘s
framework does not take into account. For example, ―punitive damages
have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence,
but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the
redress of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the
individual plaintiffs in a particular case.‖495 The Court‘s solution does not
consider that states may have an interest in assessing punitive damages to
vindicate public interests. Conversely, the polar opposite theory—that
punitive damages should only consider harm to the individual plaintiff496—
argues against the Court‘s idea of allowing the jury to consider harm to
nonparties under the Gore ―reprehensibility‖ guidepost. Even though the
Court distinguishes between considering harm to nonparties to establish
reprehensibility and using it to punish the defendant, proponents of this
theory of punitive damages still argue that any consideration of harm to
anyone other than the individual plaintiff should not be considered.497
Thus, on both ends of a theoretical spectrum that may periodically describe
a particular state‘s interest in assessing punitive damages, the Court‘s
solution is inadequate.
C. The Balance of Power on the Court
Court prognosticators claim that the future of punitive damages
jurisprudence is ―somewhat unstable and uncertain‖ because ―[t]hree
Justices who favored the Court‘s current doctrine (Stevens, O‘Connor, and
Souter) have retired, while three who solidly oppose it (Scalia, Thomas,
and Ginsburg) remain on the Court.‖498 In all, there have been four new
additions to the Court since the landmark State Farm decision, and the
possibility that two or more of the newest members could choose to side
with the regular punitive damages dissenters is worthy of consideration.
But as discussed above, given the positions taken by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito in Philip Morris and Exxon, there is little reason to
believe that either (much less, both) would join fellow conservatives,
494. Gash, supra note 7, at 1267.
495. Sharkey, supra note 218, at 351–52.
496. See Colby, supra note 213, at 613–28; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 315, at
17–21.
497. See generally Gash, supra note 9, at 1643.
498. Goldstein, supra note 5; cf. Abigail Field, What Would a Justice Elena Kagan Mean
For Business?, DAILYFINANCE.COM (May 10, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing
/what-would-a-justice-elena-kagan-mean-for-business/19470758 (claiming that, ―Whatever position
Kagan might take [on punitive damages] is strictly a guess at this point.‖).
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, in reversing the current Court position.499
Further, nothing indicates that either of the two newest members—Justice
Sotomayor or Justice Kagan—(much less, both) share federalism concerns
similar to Justice Ginsburg, and given the fact that both nominees were
presented as left-leaning centrists, there is little reason to believe that either
would move to reverse the Court‘s current position.500 These conclusions
are reinforced by an understanding that the Court‘s current position
purports to solve the multiple punishments problem, the issue that drove
the Court‘s encroachment into punitive damages jurisprudence in the first
place.501
1. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
As previously discussed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have
already had the opportunity to join with the three regular punitive damages
dissenters and overturn the current framework in Philip Morris; instead,
both joined the majority in refusing to hear the case on substantive due
process grounds.502 Moreover, even though Justice Stevens, a supporter of
the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence prior to Philip Morris, could
not go along with the opinion in Philip Morris and filed a dissent,503 both
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to the majority
opinion.504 Further, when the Oregon Supreme Court refused to reduce the
large award on remand, both were a part of the Court‘s decision to refuse a
hearing on the ―gross excessiveness‖ inquiry, and ultimately to dismiss the
entire petition as improvidently granted.505 Finally, although Justice Alito
did not take part in the opinion set forth by the Court in Exxon due to his
personal stock holdings in the Exxon Corporation,506 Chief Justice Roberts
was once again a part of a Court that refused to consider a massive punitive
damages award on substantive due process grounds.507
In sum, although there is evidence that Justices Roberts and Alito are
not wholehearted advocates of the Court‘s encroachment into the ability of
the states to oversee punitive damages awards,508 their actions to date
indicate that they are at least de facto supporters of the Court‘s overall
framework and have no intentions of either reversing course or charting a
new one.

499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

See supra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Parts IV.C.2–3.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part III.D.
See Stohr, supra note 402.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part IV.A.
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2. Justice Sotomayor
Upon the nomination of Justice Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, those
who closely follow punitive damages jurisprudence were understandably
interested in her judicial track record on the subject. But the few cases
involving punitive damages she heard as a judge in the Southern District of
New York and while sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have
led some to conclude that her views ―are largely a mystery, with her few
rulings on the topic offering limited insight into how she would rule as a
justice.‖509 Nonetheless, a close analysis of her record reveals that Justice
Sotomayor will most likely do nothing to upset the punitive damages status
quo.
Those concerned about the size of damage awards were troubled to find
three decisions in Justice Sotomayor‘s past where she upheld punitive
damage awards. First, while chief judge in the Southern District of New
York, in Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken,510 Sotomayor upheld a
$1.25 million punitive damages award against a large Swedish banking
corporation in a gender discrimination case under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.511 Second, while a member of a three-judge panel on the Second
Circuit, in Moskowitz v. Coscette,512 she upheld a $75,000 punitive
damages award in favor of a police officer against the chief of police and
city government as a result of employment discrimination and free speech
violations.513 And third, in Motorola v. Uzan,514 in an opinion written by
Judge Guido Calabresi, then-Judge Sotomayor was a member of a threejudge panel that upheld a massive $1 billion punitive damages award
against a Turkish family corporation who successfully swindled $2 billion
from Motorola by securing fraudulent loans.515
Upon closer examination, however, these cases actually reveal rather
little about how Justice Sotomayor would vote in a punitive damages case
on the Supreme Court. First, in Greenbaum, Sotomayor adhered to the
ratio established by the Supreme Court (here, 3.75:1),516 and after ensuring
that the award was ―adequately related to the reprehensibility of the
conduct,‖517 decided that the punitive award should not be reduced because
the goal of deterrence demanded a sizeable award since the company
declared it could pay any punitive award.518 Again, her opinion evidenced a
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

See Stohr, supra note 22.
67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id.
No. 00-7671, 2001 WL 51009, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2001).
See id.
509 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2007).
See id. at 76–77.
See Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id. at 270.
See id. at 272.
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sensitivity to the Court‘s established framework as applied to the facts of a
particular case. Second, in Moskowitz, the Second Circuit‘s award of
$75,000 did not ―shock the judicial conscience‖ in comparison to the
$125,000 compensatory award.519 There is nothing in Moskowitz to
indicate an attempt on the part of Justice Sotomayor to push for a large
punitive damage agenda. And third, in Motorola, the original punitive
award was $2 billion (in addition to another $2 billion in compensatory
damages), and the award was reduced to $1 billion after the Second Circuit
panel, which included Sotomayor, remanded it because the trial court had
not demonstrated an analysis of the Gore factors.520 This approach not only
evidences a commitment to the Court‘s constitutional analysis but also
shows that Justice Sotomayor is not simply intent on maintaining large
punitive awards.
In addition to the weakness of the concerns raised by the instances
where Justice Sotomayor upheld punitive awards in the past, there are
additional reasons to believe that she would not act in a way that would
threaten the status quo. First, in her Senate confirmation hearings,
Sotomayor expressed her opinion that business needs law to be
predictable,521 a view that is similar to Justice Souter‘s majority opinion in
Exxon.522 Second, in a case rarely mentioned by those who commented
about the cases in which she upheld punitive awards in the past, thenDistrict Chief Judge Sotomayor in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law
Examiners ruled that the case did not warrant a punitive award at all.523 In
Bartlett, where a bar applicant with a learning disability sued for violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Sotomayor awarded $12,500 in
compensatory damages but found that ―[b]ecause of the ‗chaos‘ in the
learning disability field and the ambiguity in the law, I do not find the level
of ‗malice‘ or ‗reckless indifference‘ to federally protected rights that
would justify an award of punitive damages.‖524 Third, and perhaps most
importantly, there is literally no evidence in any of Justice Sotomayor‘s
articles or opinions to indicate that she believes states should decide cases
519. See Moskowitz v. Coscette, No. 00-7671, 2001 WL 51009, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2001).
520. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 509 F.3d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 2007).
521. See Greg Stohr & William McQuillen, Sotomayor Hits Pro-Business Note in Senate
Testimony (Update2) BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20
601103&sid=aJ5Kg1jiULuQ (quoting Sotomayor as saying, ―‗In business, the predictability of law
may be the most necessary‘. . . .‖).
522. See Curt Cutting, More on Sotomayor and Punitive Damages, CALIFORNIA PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: AN EXEMPLARY BLOG (July 16, 2009, 10:07 AM), http://calpunitives.blogspot.com/20
09/07/more-on-sotomayor-and-punitive-damages.html (―That statement echoes the reasoning of
Justice Souter in his opinion for the majority in Exxon Shipping, in which he stated that a [sic]
imposing a maximum one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages eliminates
arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes.‖).
523. 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
524. Id. at 1153.
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that heretofore have been considered under the federal due process
framework.
Finally, a 1996 law review article525 by Justice Sotomayor led some to
claim that she rejects limits on punitive damages. In the article, she said
that ―bills that place arbitrary limits on jury verdicts in personal injury
cases‖ are ―inconsistent with the premise of the jury system.‖526 However,
upon careful reading of the context of the statements, it is clear that her
remarks do not communicate an unwillingness to restrain jury verdicts—
Justice Sotomayor was simply arguing that properly restraining jury
verdicts should be the province of the judiciary as opposed to the
legislature.527 In short, her statement is illustrative of her views on the
separation of powers instead of a preference for unrestrained punitive
awards.
In conclusion, a close examination of Justice Sotomayor reveals very
little reason to believe that she would seek to change the course the Court
has charted in regard to punitive damages. Instead, as some have already
suggested, her position will most likely resemble the approach of Justice
Stevens in this area of law.528 This will most likely lead her to be
considered a centrist529 who maintains a middle ground on the issue.530
3. Justice Kagan
Unlike Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan has no judicial track record to
examine, making it more difficult, of course, to predict the position she
might take on punitive damages.531 In addition, despite a career in
academics, she published relatively little, giving very few hints as to where
she might stand on substantive legal issues.532
In trying to read between the lines to predict where she might stand on
issues affecting ―big business‖ (such as punitive damages), some have
noted that during her time as solicitor general, Justice Kagan represented
525. Sonia Sotomayor, Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35 (1996).
526. Id. at 46.
527. See id. at 46–47.
528. See Stohr, supra note 22 (citing punitive damages critic, Evan Tager, of Mayer Brown
LLP in Washington, DC, in this regard). It is important to remember that although Justice Stevens
dissented in Philip Morris, he went to great lengths to emphasize his belief that the Court‘s
substantive due process framework established in both Gore and State Farm ―were correctly
decided.‖ Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
529. See Levine & Francis, supra note 23.
530. See id. (―In class actions, Sotomayor has occupied a strict middle ground, her record
reflecting sympathy neither for those in favor of such issues, nor skepticism of them. ‗She looks at
each case on its unique facts to determine whether a class action is appropriate,‘ said [Evan]
Tager.‖).
531. See Field, supra note 498 (―Whatever position Kagan might take on the[] issue[] [of
punitive damages] is strictly a guess at this point.‖).
532. See id.
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shareholders more often than did her predecessors, lending credibility to
the thought that she might seek to defend large punitive damages
awards.533 However, still others have noted that she worked for a corporate
law firm early in her legal career where ―she had some socialization and
training from the pro-big business perspective,‖ and further pointed out
that business lawyers were openly positive about her potential appointment
prior to her nomination.534 These mixed signals produce the popular
conclusion that any prediction as to what position she would take on
punitive damages is ―strictly a guess.‖535
Justice Kagan‘s characterizations as a ―consensus builder‖536 and a
―centrist‖537 are worthy of consideration, however. If these
characterizations prove to be true, then it would naturally be less likely for
her to seek to overturn a long line of precedent and establish a new
punitive damages regime. Although a ―consensus builder‖ will discover
both liberal and conservative Justices on both sides of punitive damages
jurisprudence, it is the tendency to generate peace and stability that might
lead a ―centrist‖ to prefer upholding the status quo in this area of the law.
Consequently, although there is no reason to believe that Justice Kagan
would adopt the positions advocated by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and
Thomas, the mystery surrounding what Justice Kagan brings to the Court
makes her the least predictable of the new Justices in regard to punitive
damages. Still, even if she did find reason to join the regular dissenters in
this area of the law, the call to return punitive damages to the states would
still fall one vote shy of success.
CONCLUSION
Although wagering on the direction the Supreme Court will take on any
issue is not an advisable way to earn a living, it still appears safe to
characterize the future of the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence in
light of the new composition as plus ça change, plus c‟est la même chose
(―the more things change, the more they stay the same‖). The appearance of
four new Justices since the landmark State Farm decision could obviously
change its course if so desired, but a careful analysis of the new Justices
along with the Court‘s ―fix‖ of the multiple punishments problem in Philip
Morris combine to create a strong likelihood of a silent phase regarding
punitive damages.

533. See id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Bill Mears, High Court Contender Kagan Brings Reputation for Consensus Building,
CNN.COM (May 10, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/04/scotus.contenders.kagan/
index.html (―It is that reputation as a consensus-builder that has earned the solicitor general positive
reviews on the left and right.‖).
537. See Gerstein, supra note 23.
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First, concerning both the substantive due process and procedural due
process review frameworks it has created, the Court apparently believes it
has nothing left to say on the issue. Second, there is no indication that any
of the four new members of the Court (much less the necessary two) have
any inclination to adopt the federalism concerns of Justices Ginsburg,
Scalia, and Thomas that would necessarily precipitate a reversal of the
course the Court has taken.
The Supreme Court has apparently butted in for the last time in
punitive damages jurisprudence. Despite witnessing a change in nearly half
of the Court‘s membership, its future in regard to this area of the law will
presumably remain the same.
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